

h. Politics
T H E
P O L I T I C K S

On B O T H S I D E S,

With REGARD to

FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Stated from their own WRITINGS, and
examined by the Course of EVENTS.

W I T H

Some OBSERVATIONS on the

P R E S E N T S T A T E of A F F A I R S

I N

G R E A T B R I T A I N,

And the Effects of our NEGOTIATIONS, for
several Years past.

Juxta se posita magis elucescunt.

The SECOND EDITION corrected.

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
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T H E
POLITICKS *on both Sides,*
With REGARD to
Foreign Affairs, &c.

“  HE whole Face of Affairs in
“ Europe is, within the Space of
“ the last Year, so much alter'd,
“ that it is almost impossible for
“ the most unconcern'd Spectator
“ to prevent his Thoughts from
“ running out into Questions and
“ Suppositions about it. *Curiosity* it self, the low-
“ est Principle of all our Enquiries, will force its
“ Way into such a Scene; and will expect, or in-
“ vent, some Account of so surprizing a Change
“ from a CALM, hardly parallel'd by any PAST
“ PROSPECT, to a sudden gathering of CLOUDS;
“ which, if not soon dissipated, must burst and
“ discharge Themselves somewhere or other.
“ But when *Self-Interest* is join'd to this *natu-*
“ *ral Curiosity*, and it becomes a *personal* and *na-*
“ *tional Concern* to know the main Causes and
“ Springs of *such Events*, as all are interested in;
“ there seems then to be a RIGHT, strictly so cal-
“ led, to demand and receive all the Satisfaction
“ the Nature of such Affairs can permit to be
“ given. In a *free Nation* especially, where no
“ Reso-

“ Resolutions can be effectual without the Consent
 “ and Support of the Community, every Man,
 “ who can think at all, will think it an *injurious*
 “ *Treatment*, if, at a proper Time and in a pro-
 “ per Manner, *some Light be not held forth to them*,
 “ and some satisfactory Solution given of *such Ap-*
 “ *pearances*, as must otherwise very much perplex
 “ and disturb Him.

I chuse to begin this Discourse in the very same Words with the Author of the * ENQUIRY, about seven Years ago; not only because the present State of Affairs in *Europe* seems to be as like the State of Affairs, at that Time, as two Conjunctions can possibly resemble each other; but likewise for a Justification of the *present Enquiry*, to which I think myself equally intitled, though perhaps not so well instructed as *that Writer*; and
 “ † every Briton, who, either by his Treasure or
 “ his Blood, by his Vote or his Interest, by his
 “ Person or his Representative, hath in Time past
 “ borne any Part in procuring the *common Peace*,
 “ and establishing the several Interests of *Europe*;
 “ every such Member of the *British* Nation, who
 “ by *this Time* flattered Himself with Hopes of
 “ enjoying the Result of all his Toil, and Taxes,
 “ and Blood in an *universal Peace*, and an *extended*,
 “ *undisturb'd Commerce*, hath a Right to ask —
 “ *How comes this Face of Things to be again over-*
 “ *clouded? — All Europe once more in Agi-*
 “ *tation!*

It is not improbable that *Those*, *† in whose Time of Power such a Crisis of political Affairs appears in the World, may ascribe it intirely to an Event, which no human Wisdom could possibly foresee; I mean the Death of the late King of Poland; but whether it is really owing to *that Incident*, or to

* See an Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain, &c. p. 3.

† Id. p. 4.

*† Id.

to some *other Causes* more remote, shall be the Business of our present Enquiry.

When I first took the Resolution of writing upon this Subject, I propos'd, for the Sake of Impartiality, not only to state the *Politicks on both Sides from their own Writings*, but to place their respective Arguments upon every material Topick of Debate, for several Years past, in opposite Columns, and in their own Words; with no farther Remarks upon them than what should be just necessary to connect them together, and make them generally understood. This, no Doubt, would have been the most effectual Way to obviate the common Complaints against *political Writers*, and to purge myself from the Imputation of designing to misrepresent the Arguments on *either Side*, or to draw false Conclusions from them. But, upon Trial, I found the Reasoning of *some Writers*, whom I am oblig'd to quote, so very diffus'd, and scatter'd up and down in several Parts of the *same Book*, or reiterated with frequent Variations in *others*, according to the different Circumstances of Affairs; that I could not put my first Design in Execution, without swelling *this Treatise* to a much larger Bulk, than would be either proper, or agreeable upon such an Occasion. I was therefore oblig'd to take a shorter Method, by collecting their Sense together, and reducing their Arguments, upon several Points, into Propositions, with marginal References to the *Writers* Themselves. As I chuse this Method for the Reader's Ease more than my own; so I assure the Publick that wherever I find myself under this Necessity of abridging the Arguments on *either Side*, I will do it with the utmost Exactness and Fidelity, as far as I understand them myself; and though it may be soon perceived to *which Side* I am inclin'd, I shall scorn to attempt any mean Triumph over the
other,

other, or to impose on the World, by any wilful Misrepresentation; for I think it not only an unfair, but a most ridiculous Way of writing upon any disputable, or disputed Subject, to wrest the Words of an *Adversary*, or the Measures, upon which they are founded, to any Meaning, or Consequences, which do not naturally result from them. Such Artifices as These may impose upon Persons, unacquainted with the Point in Debate, and serve the little Purposes of a *temporary Expedient*; but will always recoil at last upon *Those*, who make use of them, and do most Hurt to *that Cause*, which they are calculated to promote.

This being premised, as the Rule of my own Conduct in the present Enquiry, I shall now proceed to a cursory View of the principal Transactions for several Years past, and the Sentiments of *both Parties* upon them, as they appear in their Writings; with some Observations on the Course of *Events*, as the surest Guides to us for discovering the true Causes of the present Commotions in *Europe*.

It is acknowledged, on *both Sides*, that all our late Negotiations and Expedients, to preserve the publick Tranquility, were occasioned by the first Treaty of *Vienna* and the Counter-Alliance of *Hanover*, which succeeded it; for his late Majesty was pleased to assure us from the Throne, in the Year 1724, *that We had Peace with ALL POWERS abroad*; but We had scarce Time to congratulate ourselves on this happy Situation of Affairs, before the whole Scene was again embroiled, as the *Enquirer* most pathetically complains in the Passages before cited. The chief Point therefore in Dispute at that Time was, to what Causes so sudden and, as it was called, so *unaccountable a Conjunction* was really owing. The *Court-Writers*, as well as their *Patrons*, imputed it, in the most peremptory Man-
ner,

ner, to the dangerous Designs of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, against the Liberties of *Europe* in general, as well as the most valuable Interests of *Great Britain* in particular. The *Writers on the other Side* seemed to look upon it only as a *defensive Treaty* between two Nations, whose Interest it was to ally Themselves to each other at that particular Juncture. This Point was fully canvass'd about Five Years ago, by * a Gentleman, who wrote under the Name of JOHN TROT, and the Author of the *Enquiry*; in the Course of which Debate, I think it was indubitably proved that the Prospect of the *Infanta's* being sent back from *France*, after the Duke of *Orleans's* Death, induced the Court of *Spain* to begin a Negotiation with the *Emperor*; and that her being actually sent back, with our *Refusal of the sole Mediation*, determined his *Catholick Majesty* to put a finishing Hand to *that Treaty*. To This it was added that our Refusal to restore *Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, in Pursuance of a *Promise*, as They pretended, founded on a LETTER from his late Majesty to the King of *Spain*, might be another Motive to such a Resolution at the Court of *Madrid*; for though the very Existence of any *such Letter* was at first strenuously denied, a Copy of it hath been since produced in both Houses of Parliament; and if it does not contain an *absolute Promise*, yet it furnishes Them with a Pretension, at least, to found such a Claim upon it. It was likewise suggested, not without some Grounds, that our concluding a *private Treaty* at *Madrid*, in the Year 1721, whilst We were Mediators between *Spain* and the *Emperor*, gave such an Umbrage at the Court of *Vienna* as help'd to pave the Way to a Reconciliation between

* See Trot's second Letter to the Craftsman, Vol 4. p 74. Defence of the Enquiry, p. 14. John Trot's third Letter to the Craftsman, Vol. 4. p. 272.

tween *those two Powers*; one of whom had received a very great Indignity from the Court of *France*, and the other not a little displeas'd with That of *Great Britain* upon the Account beforementioned. It deserves a Remark in this Place, that *Spain* depended upon *France* as her Friend at the Congress, and the *Emperor* look'd upon *Great Britain* in the same Light; but *both Parties* being thus disobliged by the *respective Mediators*, on whom They rely'd, it became almost necessary for the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* to contrive some Method of reconciling Themselves. This seems, at least, a plausible Reason for † “two Powers, that could hardly be
 “kept within the Bounds of common Decency to-
 “wards one another, by all the Address of *two*
 “powerful Mediators in a publick Treaty, abandon-
 “ing that Mediation; and, in the Middle of it,
 “privately running into one another's Arms with
 “all the Marks of cordial Affection and a reso-
 “lute Friendship.

But whatever might be the true Grounds of this sudden Revolution of Counsels and Dispositions in the *two Courts*; it is certain that the Treaty of *Vienna*, and the Measures taken in Opposition to it, laid the Foundation of that long Series of Negotiations, Conventions, and Projects of Accommodation, which engross'd all our Attention for several Years together. Let us therefore review the Conduct of *both Parties*, upon this Occasion.

Now, if the Treaty of *Vienna* contain'd nothing but an Accommodation of Differences between the *two Courts*, with the usual Stipulations of *Peace*, *Commerce*, and *mutual Defence*, (as the *contracting Parties* declared) We had no Occasion to take such an Alarm, or to be in such an Hurry of putting ourselves in a Posture of Defence. We ought

† Enquiry, p 5.

ought rather to have rejoiced that *these Powers* had found out a Method of adjusting their own Differences, after We had attempted it in vain; since nothing else was wanting at that Time, as We have been often told, to compleat the general Repose and Tranquility of *Europe*. Nay, it would certainly have been our Interest, in such a Case, to accede to *that Treaty*, as We were invited to do, instead of entertaining such terrible Apprehensions from it, and taking such extraordinary Measures to defeat it.

But it must be confess'd, at the same Time, that if the Allies of *Vienna* had really entered into any such dangerous Engagements as our *Politicians* apprehended, and their *Advocates* positively asserted, it was certainly their Duty to oppose them with the utmost Vigour.

For this Reason, the *Author of the Enquiry* made it his chief Business to prove that there was a *secret, offensive Treaty* between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, besides those publick ones of *Peace* and *Commerce*, which They had communicated to the World. Nay, He pretended to be so well informed of *this Fact*, that He gave us the particular Articles of it; viz. " 1. * That the Empe-
 " ror was to assist *Spain*, in obtaining *Gibraltar*
 " by Force. 2. That *Spain* was to support the
 " Emperor, in his new Establishment of the *Ostend*
 " Company; for both which Purposes, as He told
 " us, the Quota's of *Money* on one Side, and of
 " Soldiers on the other were actually settled. 3.
 " That the two Courts had undertaken to place
 " the Pretender on the Throne of *Great Britain*,
 " and to begin with that Enterprize, before They
 " proceeded to put their other Projects in Exe-
 " cution." These were Points, which particularly affected *Great Britain*, in her tenderest Concerns.

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But

* *Enquiry*, p. 34.

But the *same Author* likewise discovered another Article in this *secret, offensive Treaty*, which had the same bad Aspect upon all *Europe*, and threatened Her with universal Monarchy; “* I mean, “*says He*, the Marriages of the two *Arch-Dutch-* “*esses*, Daughters to the present Emperor, with “the two *Infants of Spain*, Sons to the King by “the present Queen.” *He then observes*, “that “such an Alliance must constitute a Power in one “Family beyond all, that We have known, formidable and irresistible.” In another Place, *He leaves us to judge*, “† whether ever hitherto any “one Scheme hath appeared in *Europe*, of a Destruction so universal, and of a Ruin so extended, “as *This* appears plainly to be.

It was indeed alledged that even in the *publick Treaty of Vienna* greater Privileges in *Commerce* were granted to the *† *Emperor's* Subjects than to Those of *Great Britain*; but the Falshood of this Assertion appeared very plainly from the *Treaty* itself, which puts Them only on the same Foot with the *most favoured Nations*; and *Great Britain* having long been in that Number, whatever Privileges of *Trade* any other Nation may obtain from his *Catholick Majesty*, must be conceded to *Us*, at the same Time, by Virtue of former *Treaties*. Besides, the King of *Spain* immediately disown'd any such Design by his Ministers, and afterwards in a formal Article of a Treaty; which is so remarkable, that I cannot forbear quoting it.

“†† *The Ministers of his Britannick Majesty*, and “of his *most Christian Majesty* having PRETENDED “that in the *Treaties* concluded at *Vienna*, between the *Emperor* and the King of *Spain*, in the “Year 1725, there were diverse Clauses, that in- “fringed

* *Enquiry* p. 86.

† *Ib.* p. 91.

*† *Ib.* p. 62.

†† See the *Treaty of Seville*, in the original *French*, Art. 3.

(II)

“ fringed the Articles of the several Treaties of
“ Commerce, or of the Treaties of Peace, in which
“ Commerce may be concerned, antecedent to the
“ Year 1725; his *Catholick Majesty* hath declared,
“ as He declares by the present Article, that He
“ never MEANT to grant, nor will suffer to sub-
“ sist, by virtue of the said Treaties of *Vienna*,
“ any Privilege contrary to the Treaties here above
“ confirmed.

It was likewise affirmed that the *Emperor's Minister* had acknowledged some Engagement with *Spain*, relating to *Gibraltar*; but it appears from the † *Enquiry* itself that his *Imperial Majesty* entered into this Engagement upon the Representation of the Court of *Spain*, that there remain'd still some Things to regulate between his *Catholick Majesty* and the King of Great Britain; in which, it is probable that the Court of *Spain* might include the famous Letter of 1721, upon which They founded their Pretensions and Demand of *Gibraltar*; but the *Emperor* would engage no farther than to employ his *Mediation* between Them, under the following Restrictions; that the Points in Dispute had any Relation to the Treaty of London, or arose in Consequence of that Treaty; nor even then, unless it should prove agreeable to his *Britannick Majesty*. — In another Part of the same Book it appears, * that a NOBLE PERSON in an high Station having publicly declared it, in the House of Lords, as an undoubted Truth, that there was a secret, offensive Alliance between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, which contain'd Articles in it destructive to the Rights of Britain, both with Regard to its Possessions and its Commerce abroad; the *Imperial Resident* here was ordered to give Satisfaction to the British Court, upon this Subject, by producing the Article, which his Master had entered into, relating to GIBRALTAR;

B 2

and

† p. 21.

* p. 35.

and this Article imply'd no more than that his *Imperial Majesty* had engaged to use his *good Offices*, if it should be agreeable to his *Britannick Majesty*, as his *Minister* had before declared. But all these Assurances were far from giving our *Politicians*, or their Advocate the *Enquirer*, any Satisfaction that there was no *such Engagement*; tho' the Event hath sufficiently shew'd that the *Emperor* never gave his *Catholick Majesty* the least Assistance towards the Recovery of *that Place*, whilst it was besieg'd, nor at any other Time, during our long Misunderstanding with *those Courts*.

As for the *OSTEND COMPANY*, it was always treated as a Point of so little Consequence to our essential Interests, on * *one Side*; and hath since been declared so by the † *other*; that I shall not detain the Reader with any particular Detail of the Controversies about it. But it may not be amiss just to take Notice, as We pass along, that *this Company* hath accidentally proved of great Detriment to us, not only by contributing to the late Disturbances in *Europe*, but likewise by putting all Countries upon Projects of the same Kind; and though his *Imperial Majesty* hath at length consented to the Abolition of the *Company* at *Ostend*, He is far from having given up all Thoughts of the *Trade*, being now carrying on a Negotiation at *Lisbon* for that Purpose.

Let us therefore return to the *secret, offensive Treaty*; by which the two Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, as the *Enquirer* asserted, had not only entered into the strongest Engagements upon all *these Points*, but likewise to place the *Pretender* upon the Throne of *Great Britain*. This was, indeed, an alarming Consideration, and what might justly

* See the *Craftsman*, Vol. 1. p. 202.

† See the *London Journal*, Dec. 21, 1728; or the *Craftsman*, Vol. 4 p. 84.

justly provoke the Resentments of a free People ; especially, when They were assured, in the most authoritative Manner, “ that * the *British* Court “ had positive Intelligence, and Intelligence from “ more than one Person, and such as could be in- “ tirely depended on, that one express Article of “ *this Alliance* between the *Emperor* and *Spain* con- “ tain’d an Obligation in Favour of the PRETEN- “ DER, and a Stipulation to make the Attempt “ for Him in *England*, before opening the War “ in any other Parts.” — It is no Wonder, I say, that the Passions of the People were inflamed by such Declarations as These, and broke out into the warmest Addresses against *those Powers*, whom They supposed to be engaged in such destructive Measures. Some of Them were so very zealous, upon this Occasion, that They not only express’d their cheerful Acquiescence under a Land-Tax of † *four Shillings in the Pound*, but made a voluntary Offer of the *other sixteen, and of every thing else, that is dear and valuable to Them.*

Here likewise I must repeat my Acknowledgment, that if the Intelligence of *such a Design* was well founded, our *Ministers* were not only fully justify’d in all their Precautions to defeat it, but would have been justify’d in much farther Lengths than They thought fit to go. But when all this *positive Intelligence, convincing Evidence, and pretended Certainty* appeared to be founded only on †* *SUSPICIONS, or something more than SUSPICIONS, built upon APPEARANCES* ; or, at best, when the whole Evidence, as ** *another Writer* sums it up, consisted in nothing but *Wharton’s Rambles, Ripperda’s Chat-Chat, Hearsays of what one great Man writ, concerning what another great Man said, three Muscovite Ships coming to Spain, Embarkations,*

* Enquiry, p. 52.

†* Enquiry, p. 33.

† Totness Address.

** Craftsman, vol. 4. p. 257.

barkations, which were never made, and Armies, which were never assembled ; when This, I say, appeared to be the Case, many Persons were inclined to suspend their Belief of any such Design, till They saw it a little more authentically proved ; especially, since his Imperial Majesty thought fit to disown it by his Minister here, in the most solemn Manner ; which He had no Occasion to do, if He was really grown so inveterate against his Britannick Majesty, as the Court-Writers represented Him. Nay, I have been informed, upon pretty good Authority, that long before Mr. Palm's Memorial, or the Enquiry was published, his Imperial Majesty took an Opportunity of declaring, upon the Faith of a Christian and the Word of an Emperor, that He was so far from having enter'd into any Measures for placing the Pretender on the British Throne, that no such Overtures had been made to Him. If This should be true, as I hope it is not, what shall We say to those Men, who inflamed the Nation to such an Height, upon this Account, and — Let them read their own Article of Impeachment against the late Earl of Oxford, for corrupting the Fountain of Truth, and putting Falshoods into the Mouth of Majesty.

Her Czarish Majesty likewise purged Herself from the same Charge, by a solemn Declaration * that she had never entered into any Engagements with the Pretender against his Britannick Majesty, and that she look'd upon all such Reports as meer Calumnies spread abroad by the English Ministers, in order to justify their Measures at home, and prejudice foreign Courts against Her.

The Gentlemen on the Country Side were therefore justify'd, as far as Events could justify them, in their Backwardness to believe any such Design ; for from that Time to This there hath not been any

* *Roussset*, vol. 4. p. 222.

any Attempt, nor any Appearance of an Attempt, in Favour of the Pretender. Nay, even the Court-Writers themselves seem'd to be ashamed of this Argument a Year or two after, when all their *positive and undoubted Intelligence* dwindled away to † APPREHENSIONS ONLY that there might be Engagements, in Favour of the Pretender. I believe They have since made a Discovery that even their *Apprehensions* were groundless, and that there never were any such Engagements, either *ostensible*, or *non-ostensible*.

However, these Alarms had such an Effect, at that Time, on the Minds of some Men, that instead of advising his Majesty to accede to the *Vienna Treaty*, under any Conditions, They thought it immediately necessary to project a *Counter-Alliance*; which was concluded at *Hanover* soon after, and laid the Foundation of fresh Disputes, both at Home and Abroad.

The first contracting Parties in *this Treaty* were the Crowns of *Great Britain, France and Prussia*; who invited the *States General*, by an express Article, to accede to it, and agreed to invite others. But the *Dutch*, who had this particular Compliment paid Them in the *Treaty* it self, did not accede to it, till about eleven Months after it had been sign'd at *Hanover*, and even then under * *very large Restrictions*,

About the same Time, his Majesty of *Prussia* took an Opportunity of detaching Himself from *this Alliance*, in which He was an original Party. Whether this Division was occasion'd by the Affair of *Thorn*, which was suffer'd to dye away, as soon as the *Treaty* was made, or by any other Cause,

† *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain. &c.* printed for Roberts, in the Year 1729. P. 49. *Craftsman*, vol. 4. P. 243.

* *General Collection of Treaties, &c.* printed for Knapp, &c. P. 153.

Cause, I cannot say ; but every good Protestant must lament any Misunderstandings between *two Crowns*, which are so nearly ally'd as Those of *Great Britain* and *Prussia*.

However, to compensate this Loss of *one Ally*, We soon gain'd another in the King and Kingdom of *Sweden*, who acceded to this Treaty under certain † Modifications and Restrictions, by the persuasive Eloquence of Count *Horn*, who acquainted the States *† that the Treaty of *HANOVER* did not lay Them under so many Obligations as FORMER TREATIES ; though They were to receive a Subsidy of *fifty thousand Pounds a Year*, for *three Years*, both from *England* and *France*, as the Price of their Accession.

The King of *Denmark* was afterwards prevail'd upon to follow the same Example, in Consideration of a *large Subsidy*, for four Years, and other Stipulations in his Favour. It was expressly agreed in the Treaty that *this Subsidy* should be paid by the *most Christian King* ; but a Dispute arising, some Years afterwards, between the Crowns of *France* and *Denmark*, concerning the Difference of †† *Danish* and *Hamburg* Money, We were so good as to prevent the ill Consequences of such a Dispute, by paying the Difference our selves ; which amounted to a considerable Sum.

The ** *Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel* contracted likewise with his *Britannick Majesty* to keep a Body of 12,000 Men in a Readiness for his Service, upon certain Conditions, which do not fully appear in the *publick Convention*, nor any where else ; but it is well known that *these Troops* have cost the *British Nation* almost a *Million and an half Sterl.* without

† *Col. of Treaties*, p. 166.

*† *Roussel*, vol. 3. p. 300.

†† *Votes of the House of Commons* for the Year 1731-2, or the *Craftsman*, No. 313.

** *Collection of Treaties*, v. l. 4.

p. 438.

without doing us the least Service, during the whole Time They continued in our Pay.

Amongst all these Allies and Auxiliaries, I must not forget his serene Highness the Duke of * *Wolffenbuttle*; who brought up the Rear of this formidable Confederacy, and not only engaged to GUARANTY all his Majesty's Dominions in *Great Britain, Ireland and Germany*, but likewise to furnish a Body of 5000 Men (not to be moved out of *Germany, or Holland*) for so small a Sum as *twenty-five thousand Pounds per Annum*, during the Space of *four Years*; which amounted, for the whole Term, to no more than *one hundred thousand Pounds*.

Having now stated the Case of the *Hanover Alliance* in its full Strength, We are naturally led to the Reasonings of *different Parties*, on this Subject.

The Gentlemen of the *Country Party* argued that, supposing the *secret Treaty of Vienna* to be without Foundation, We were a little too precipitate in throwing off an *old Ally*, under that Pretence; and though They were very far from adopting the vulgar Notion, † that *ENGLAND ought never to be in Peace and Friendship with FRANCE*, They apprehended that so *close a Conjunction*, at that Time, naturally tended to make us too dependent upon Her, and would not produce the good Effects, which were proposed by it.

To This it was answer'd by the *other Party*, that *† *Power is fluctuating, and though We did lend the Emperor an helping Hand, We are not to let Him do what He pleases; that when We set Him up, it was good Politicks, and now it is equally*

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* *Col. of Treaties*, 178. † *Craftsman*, vol. 1. p. 111. *The Case of Dunkirk*, p. 47. or the *Craftsman*, vol. 6. p. 208.

*† See a Letter to the *occasional Writer*, printed in the Year 1727; or the *occasional Writer*, No. 3. p. 13.

qually good to take Him down; or, as the || Enquirer more gravely argued, that We should find in HIM, at last, the Enemy We dreaded only in ANOTHER. In short, it was then the Court-Doctrine that France was so much reduced, and the Emperor grown so formidable by the Success of the late War, that the *Ballance of Europe* required us to shift Hands, and throw our Weight into the Scale of France, which was now become our most *natural Ally*. For this Reason, it was argued that We might safely rely on her *good Faith* and *Sincerity*; nay, a *certain Gentleman* undertook to be her *Guaranty*, and made Himself answerable for her Conduct, by repeated Declarations in the *House of Commons*.

Let us now proceed to the Consequences of *this Alliance*, and see how far the Reasonings of *either Party* were justify'd by them.

As the *Treaty of Hanover* was concerted with a profess'd Design to defeat the dangerous Projects of the *Vienna Allies*, it was evident at first Sight that such Measures would be taken, as must necessarily create some farther Misunderstandings, if not an absolute Rupture, between the different Parties in the *two Alliances*; for when such strong Suspicions are entertain'd on *one Side*, as to put Them in Arms against the *other*, and the *latter* know Themselves to be innocent of the *Designs* laid to their Charge, They will naturally look upon *such Apprehensions* as meer Pretences to pick a Quarrel with Them, and resent those Measures as *Acts of Hostility*, which are carried on under Colour of *Self-Defence*.

How far This was our Case, with Relation to the *Spaniards*, at the Time I am speaking of; or how far the *Spaniards*, at least, might reason in such a Manner, will soon appear by the Event.

The

The Conclusion of the Treaty of *Hanover* was immediately followed with a considerable Augmentation of our *Land-Forces* at home, besides the 12,000 *Hessians*, and other foreign Troops retain'd in our Pay, as I have already observed.

At the same Time, three large Squadrons of Ships of War were fitted out at a vast Expence, and dispatch'd with all possible Expedition to different Parts of the World; one to the *Baltick*, another to the Coast of *Spain*, and a third to the *West-Indies*. The Motives for equipping these Fleets, and the good Effects They produced, are stated very pompously in the *Enquiry*.

That sent to the * *Baltick*, says He, was design'd to prevent the *Czarina's* Scheme for deposing the King of *Sweden*, and thereby preserve the *Ballance of the North*. But it happened a little untowardly that *Sweden* had just before made Peace with the *Muscovites*, and was under no Apprehension from Them; as They acquainted Sir *Charles Wager*, our Admiral, when He came before *Stockholm*, and made Them a voluntary Offer of his Assistance. Another right reverend Gentleman, who afterwards wrote upon the same Subject, tells us that this Squadron was sent to the *Baltick*, not only to prevent the *Czarina's* Design, but † to enable our FRIENDS in *Sweden* to declare for us, by awing the Duke of *Holstein's* Party, who did all in their Power to obstruct the *Accession*. This, it seems, with the *Subsidy* before-mentioned to the King, and some other proper Applications to the leading Men, produced the desired Effect, and sufficiently justify'd that Expedition.

The Squadron sent to the Coasts of *† *Spain* was ordered to prevent an Attempt from thence,

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* *Enquiry*, p. 95. † *The Treaty of Seville impartially considered*, printed for *Roberts*, in the Year 1730, p. 10. or the *Craftsman*, vol. vi. p. 66.

*† *Enquiry*, p. 95.

in Favour of the *Pretender*, by virtue of the *secret, offensive Treaty* so often mentioned; and the *Enquirer* tells us * *that the Appearance of this Fleet upon the Spanish Coasts did actually prevent the Execution of such an Attempt.* But here again *that Writer* seems to be mistaken, or misinform'd; for it appears by Sir *John Fennings's* Letter, dated Aug. 10, 1726, and made publick here, *† *that the Spaniards were so little prepared to invade Us, that when He came on their Coasts, They seem'd to be in the greatest Consternation; that all the Troops They could assemble did not exceed three thousand Men; and that Those were in very bad Condition.*

As to the Squadron sent to the *West-Indies*, the ** *same Author* tells us that it fully answered the Purposes, for which it was intended, “not only by
“protecting the *Trade* of his Majesty's Subjects
“in those Parts from the Depredations of the *Spaniards*, but also by preventing the Return of the
“*Galleons* with their Stores of Money, and there-
“by disappointing *those Attempts*, which would
“have been made, and perhaps succeeded, had
“such Riches come to their Aid.

Let us now turn our Eyes a little to the *other contracting Powers in the Treaty of Hanover*, and see what Part They acted, during all these expensive and hazardous Expeditions on *our Side*.

The *Enquirer* told us that † “the Dispositions
“made by FRANCE, ever since the signing of the
“*Treaty of Hanover*, more than kept Pace with
“Us, in the Largeness of the Expence.” To support this Assertion, He assured us, “that the
“*most Christian King* augmented his regular
“Troops with *twenty-five thousand Men*; and, at
“the same Time, ordered a Levy of the *Mi-*
“*litia*, to the Number of *sixty thousand Men*;
“be-

* *Enquiry*, p. 97.
man, vol. iv. p. 266.

*† See the Letter it self; or the *Crafts-*
** *Enquiry*, p. 94. 96. † *Ib.* 102.

“ besides *twelve thousand Invalids*, put into good
 “ Order, for the Defence of his *Citadels* and
 “ *Forts*; by which Means *that King* could, with-
 “ out Inconvenience, send 165,000 Men of his re-
 “ gular *Troops* into the Field. Such, *says He*,
 “ hath been the Disposition there, for some Time,
 “ in order to shew the *new Allies* (meaning of
 “ *Vienna*) that *France* is not only in Earnest, but
 “ in a well-disposed Condition of disputing any
 “ Attempts against *itself*, or its ALLIES.

Now, supposing all This to be true, it is very far from doing the *Court-Party* any Service in the present Argument; for if the *French* had actually made any *such Dispositions*, I believe the *Enquirer* would be very much puzzled to prove that They more than kept Pace with Us, in the Largeness of the *Expence*; or that the *Allies* ever received any Benefit from them. But We may go a little farther, and defy Him to prove that there really was any such Augmentation either of their *regular Troops*, or their *Militia*, as He seems to assert, whatever *Dispositions* might have been made, or *Orders* given for that Purpose. Indeed, to speak impartially, the Court of *France* seemed ready enough to perform their Engagements with us, against the *Emperor*; but We found out, at last, that the Execution of them would not be intircly consistent with our *own Interest*, and therefore very wisely excused Them.

The *same Author* acknowledges that the * united Provinces came late into the *Alliance*; which He ascribes to the *Frame of their Constitution*; but, perhaps, it might be partly owing to the *Nature of the Treaty itself*; and I am sure He might have added very justly, that They acceded at last, under † very extensive Limitations. However, He
 assured

* Enquiry, p. 103.
 P. 153.

† Collection of Treaties, vol. iv.

assured us, that “ from the Time of their *Accession*, They shew’d a Warmth and Vigour “ worthy of the Occasion. They agreed unanimously, *said He*, upon such Augmentations of “ their LAND FORCES, as by the next Spring “ would make them above 50,000 effective Men; “ and the necessary Measures were taking for their “ having a FLEET at Sea of twenty Men of War.” He added, “ that They had been at a very great “ Charge, in providing their *Magazines*, and putting their *Barrier* and *Frontier Places* into a “ good Posture of Defence.

To this it was answered, that the *States* made no farther Augmentation of their *Land-Forces* than what was immediately necessary for their own Defence, and the Support of their *Barrier Towns*, in Pursuance of *Treaties*. How far They have put *these Places* into a good Posture of Defence, let their late *Act of Neutrality*, and the present State of Affairs determine. As to their *Fleet*, whatever *Measures* might have been taken for fitting one out, every Body knows that they were never put in Execution.—But of This I shall speak more particularly in another Place.

We were afterwards told, in * *another Treatise*, that his Majesty, as Elector, promised a Body of twelve thousand Men, to join the Danes; and for that Purpose increased his Hanoverian Troops from sixteen thousand to twenty two thousand Men. But That is a Point, which I am told would bear some farther Explanation than the *Author* was pleased to give it.—I shall only observe that the Deficiency of the *French Subsidy* to *Denmark* was partly made good by certain Deductions out of the Money granted by Parliament for the Support of the *Hessian*

* *Considerations on the present State of Affairs in Europe*, &c. printed for Roberts in the Year 1730, p. 16.

Hessian Forces; and that when * *some Gentlemen* desired to be informed whether any more and what Deductions had been made out of *that Money*, the Motion was very prudently rejected.

As for the Courts of *Sweden, Denmark, Hesse and Wolfenbuttle*, They were rather *stipendiary Auxiliaries* than *Allies and Confederates*; so that They had little more to do than to receive our Money, in regular Payments, and keep their Troops in a Readiness to march, whenever We should demand them.—How far They complied even with these Terms, I am not able to say, the Nation having never had any Occasion for their Service.

France and Holland were therefore the two Powers, on whom We chiefly rely'd; and as They were much more essentially interested in the Consequences of the *Vienna Treaty* than *Great Britain*, We had Reason to expect that They should bear, at least, an equal Proportion in the Danger and Expence of opposing it. — This Point therefore ought to be examined a little farther.

I said that immediately after the Conclusion of the *Hanover Treaty*, We dispatch'd three large Squadrons to the *Baltick*, the *Mediterranean*, and the *West-Indies*. The *first* of these produced little more Effect than procuring the Accession of *Sweden*, at a very great Expence to this Nation; but the *other two* were attended with Consequences so well known, that they hardly require any Comment. The *Instructions* to our Admirals were certainly as moderate as were ever sent out with *two such naval Armaments*; yet even blocking up the *Galleons* at *Porto Bello* with *one* of them, and hovering round the Coasts of *old Spain*, in an hostile Manner, with the *other*, were looked upon at that Court as *Acts of Hostility*, and resented accordingly. Orders were immediately dispatch'd for seizing the

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* See the *Votes of the House of Commons* for the Year 1730.

South Sea Ship, and the Effects belonging to that Company at *la vera Cruz*. The *Spanish Guarda Costa's* and *Privateers* were let loose upon our Merchants, and committed infinite Depredations for several Years together, without any Interruption, or any Reprizals. At the same Time, the *Flo-tilla*, which was said to be at least as richly laden as the *Galleons*, had the good Fortune to escape our other *Squadron* in the *Mediterranean*, under the Command of Sir Charles Wager; though it is confess'd † that They steer'd the very Course, where He was station'd to intercept them. But This was imputed to long Nights, and dark, foggy Weather. It was likewise observed, and never contradicted, as well as I can remember, that * several Ships were suffer'd to pass by the same *Squadron*, even under the Stern of our Admiral, with Stores, Provisions and other Necessaries for the Use of the *Spanish* Camp, which was then in Sight of *Gibraltar*, and preparing to besiege it.—But, perhaps, This likewise might be occasion'd by long Nights, and foggy Weather.

The Siege of that Place immediately ensued; and though We had been often assured, both within Doors and without, that our *Allies* would make it *Casus Fæderis*, and assist us in the Defence of it, They suffer'd the Siege to be push'd on with the utmost Vigour, for several Months, without giving us the least Succour of Men, Money, or Ships; and the *Spaniards*, in Return, permitted Them to carry on their Trade, both in *Europe* and the *Indies*, without any Molestation; whilst They were continually harassing us, both by Sea and Land; to say nothing farther of our Ships, which were destroyed, and our Seamen, who perished

† *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain, &c.* printed for Roberts in the Year 1729; p. 33. * *Craftsman*, vol. iv. p. 236.

rished by Thousands in the Service of their Country. Perhaps, our *Allies* might judge the *Blockade of Portobello* to be an *Act of Hostility*, as well as the *Spaniards*, and consequently not think Themselves obliged to support the *aggressing Party*, by Virtue of a *defensive Alliance*. But whatever might be the Reasons of their Conduct, it is certain that They took no Part in our Quarrels with *Spain*, nor so much as moved one Man to our Assistance. Nay, even *We* contented our selves with the bare Defence of *Gibraltar*, so loudly demanded by the Voice of the Nation, without endeavouring to divert Them from the Siege, by bombarding any of their Ports, or ravaging their Coasts; for * as soon as the Treaties were made, the Accessions procured, and the Army provided, at the Expence of Britain, which were necessary for defending Lower Saxony, We seemed to have no more to do in the War. — These were the vigorous Measures, so strongly recommended in the † *Enquiry*, as absolutely necessary in such a *Crisis of Danger*, and upon which He founds all his Apology for the Conduct of the *Ministry*.

At length, *† *Preliminaries* for a general Pacification were agreed upon; by which a *Cessation of Hostilities*, on both Sides, was stipulated for *seven Years*; and that within *four Months* after signing *this Convention*, a Congress should be form'd, in which *all the Rights and PRETENSIONS of the contracting Powers* should be examin'd, discuss'd and determined. But as soon as the *Articles* were produced in Publick, it was immediately foreseen, on one Side, that the dark and ambiguous Manner of wording them would give Occasion to many Cavils and Disputes; particularly the *second*, which runs in the following mysterious Terms; viz.

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* *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 300. † *Enquiry*, p. 81, 93.
 † *General Collection of Treaties*, vol. iv. p. 174.

“ * The Rights, or those Things, which, by
 “ Virtue of the Treaties of *Utrecht*, *Baden* and
 “ *Quadruple Alliance*, and also of those Treaties
 “ and Conventions, that preceded the Year 1725,
 “ and do not affect the *Emperor* and the States
 “ General of the *united Netherlands*, have been
 “ possess’d by any of the *contracting Powers*, shall
 “ remain untouch’d; but if any Thing should be
 “ found to have been alter’d therein, or not to
 “ have been put in Execution, the *Alteration made*,
 “ or the *Thing not executed*, shall, in a Congress to
 “ be held, be discuss’d and decided, according to
 “ the Tenor of the said *Treaties* and *Conventions*.

As soon, I say, as *this Article* was read, many Gentlemen apprehended some latent Design in it; and the Authors of the † *Craftsman* plainly intimated that this studied Ambiguity was made use of to conceal the true Intent of the *Article* from common Observation; I mean *that the Spanish Pretension to Gibraltar was to be discuss’d and decided at the Congress*.

On the *other Side*, it was asserted that *this Article* was so far from preserving the Claim of *Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, that it absolutely extinguished it. This Point was canvass’d at large by the *† *Author of the Enquiry* and *John Trot*, to whom I refer the Reader, and believe He will find that the *latter* had as much the Advantage of his Adversary in the *Argument*, as He afterwards had in the *Event*.

It was likewise apprehended by the Gentlemen of the *Country Party*, that some other Stipulations in the *Preliminaries* were not express’d in such full and plain Terms, as to cut off all Pretences for any farther Wrangling and Chicane. But the Gentlemen

* *General Collection of Treaties*, vol. iv. p. 175. † *Craftsman*, vol. ii. p. 64. 118. *† *Defence of the Enquiry*, p. 26. *Craftsman*, vol. iv. p. 288.

lemen on the *other Side* affected to laugh at these Apprehensions, as the Phantoms of distemper'd Brains, or the Artifices of factious Malecontents, congratulating Themselves on having surmounted all Difficulties, and laid the Foundation of a *solid and lasting Peace*.

Yet here again the *Country Party* were fully justify'd in their Suspicions by the *Event*; for the *Preliminaries* were no sooner sign'd, than new Disputes began to be started about the *Meaning* of them, † and such Interpretations to be put upon the Words of these Articles, as utterly destroyed the real Intent and Design of them. The Spaniards insisted that a meer Cessation of Hostilities, as stipulated by the *Preliminaries*, did not imply an actual raising of the Siege; and that the Restitution of the Ship *Prince Frederick*, with her Cargo, was not mentioned, or included in them. Besides This, the Court of *Spain* demanded an *Indulto* of 20 per Cent. on the Effects of private Persons, embark'd in the *Flotilla*, contrary to the 5th Article of the *Preliminaries*, as our Politicians and their Advocates interpreted it.

These Points having been warmly litigated by the different Parties, for eight or nine Months, They were adjusted by another Convention, negotiated by the Count de Rothemburg, Minister of France, (for We had no Minister at the Court of Spain, at that Time) and sign'd at the Pardo the 6th of March 1728. This Instrument contained an Explanation of the *Preliminaries*, and it was once more solemnly stipulated * that all the respective PRETENSIONS, on each Side, should be produced, debated and decided in the Congress; with a particular Engagement, that their Britannick and Catholick Majesties would abide by what should be there regulated. In

† Defence of the Enquiry, p. 11.
of Treaties, vol. iv. p. 182. Craftsman, vol. iv. p. 292.

* General Collection

In the mean Time, it was agreed that the *British* Squadrons should be ordered, without Delay, to withdraw from the Seas of *old* and *new Spain*; in Consideration of which, his *Catholick* Majesty likewise engaged that the Blockade of *Gibraltar* should be immediately raised; that a clear and express Order should be sent, without Delay, for restoring the Ship *Prince Frederick*, with her Cargo, to the Agents of the *South Sea Company*; and that the Effects of the *Flotilla* should be forthwith delivered to the respective Proprietors.

These Conditions being accepted, on *both Sides*, his *Catholick* Majesty ratify'd the *Preliminaries*; but before the *Ratifications* were exchanged, some new Disputes arose, concerning the *Orders*, agreed to be sent to the *West Indies*, in Pursuance of *this Convention*. These fresh Difficulties took up some Time longer; but were likewise got over by the Count *de Rothemberg* and Mr. *Vandermeer*, who managed all our Affairs at the Court of *Spain*, and the Congress was opened at *Soissons* on the 3d—14th of *June* 1728.

This Point being at length obtain'd, after a tedious Course of Negotiation and Expedients, the *ministerial Writers* began to triumph again, as if nothing but the *Form of a Treaty* was wanting to accommodate all our Differences, and establish the publick Tranquility on a lasting Foundation. They gave us the strongest Assurances that all Interruptions to our *Trade* would be effectually removed for the future; that our *plundered Merchants* would receive full Satisfaction for their Losses; and that our Right to the Possession of *Gibraltar* was so firmly secured to us, by the *Preliminaries*, and the *Act of Ratification*, that it would not be so much as mentioned in the Congress. These Things, I say, were confidently promised by the *ministerial Writers*, without Doors, and even with-

in Doors by *Those*, who set them to work. But as the Gentlemen, on the *other Side*, could see nothing in either of *these Instruments*, which contained any clear and explicit Engagements upon *these Heads*, They were not quite so sanguine in their Expectations, and the *Event* more than warranted all their Suspicions. The *Plenipotentiaries* did little more than assemble in Form at *Soissons*, and produce their *Credentials*; after which, having spent five or six Months in *Ceremonies* and *Diversions*, They broke up and separated, without adjusting any one material Point in Dispute.

It is true, indeed, that a certain Plan of Accommodation, called a *Provisional Treaty*, was framed by the Ministers of the *Hanover Allies*, during this Assembly, and sent to the respective Courts for their Approbation; but as this *Draught of a Treaty* was neither relished at home, nor accepted abroad, it does not deserve much Notice. I shall only observe, in general, that it was little more than the *Preliminaries* new modelled, and digested into the Form of a *Treaty*, without any specifick Explanation of *those Points*, which most immediately affected the Interests of *Great Britain*.

As to *Gibraltar*, several noble Peers were so far from being satisfy'd that our Right to it was effectually secured by *this Project*, that the following Motion was made in the *House of Lords*, viz. moved to resolve * “ that it is the Opinion of *this House* that, for the Honour of his Majesty, and
 “ the Preservation and Security of the Trade and
 “ Commerce of this Kingdom, effectual Care
 “ should be taken in the *present Treaty*, that the
 “ King of *Spain* do renounce all Claim and Pre-
 “ tension to *Gibraltar* and the Island of *Minorca*,
 “ in plain and strong Terms.”—But after a warm Debate, the Question being put thereupon, it was carried

* *Historical Register*, vol. xiv. p. 145.

carried in the Negative; upon which the *Peers*, who made and supported *this Motion*, entered their † *Protest*.

A Motion to the same Purpose was afterwards made in the *† *House of Commons*; which was likewise carried in the Negative, by a great Majority.

The *Country Party*, in both Houses, were equally dissatisfy'd with that Part of the *Provisional Treaty*, which related to the *Spanish Depredations*; and the *Lords* moved to, resolve, “** that it appears to *this House* that the Expence of the “ Squadron sent to the *West Indies*, under the “ Command of Vice-Admiral *Hofier*, having been “ borne by *this Nation* alone, though design'd to “ prevent the *Spaniards* from siezing the Effects “ belonging to his Majesty's *Allies*, as well as his “ *Subjects*, which were on board the *Flota* and “ *Galleons*, and from applying the Treasure to “ disturb the Peace and invade the Liberties of “ *Europe*, hath been an unreasonable Burthen on “ *this Kingdom*.”——But this Question was also resolved in the Negative, after a long Debate; upon which the *Country Lords* entered * *another Protest*.

If any Persons should be curious to see a more particular Account of *this Treaty*, I refer Them to a †† *Pamphlet*, published on that Occasion, and an *Answer* to it, under the Name of †*† *Raleigh*.

It will be found, perhaps, that *this Project* served some anniversary Purposes, for which it seemed chiefly to be calculated; but as soon as those Ends were answered, We heard no more of it. The
Prospect

† *Historial Register*, vol. xiv. p. 145.

*† *Ib.* p. 147.

** *Ib.* p. 151.

* *Ib.*

†† *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain, &c.* p. 37. printed for Roberts, in the Year 1729.

†*† *Craftsman*, vol. iv. p. 239.

Prospect of an Accommodation immediately vanished, and Affairs seem'd to be once more tending to a Rupture. Military Preparations were resumed in all Parts of *Europe*, and particularly in *England*, which is seldom behind Hand, upon such Occasions. A powerful Fleet was fitted out with the utmost Expedition, and made a gallant Appearance at *Spithead*, under the Command of Sir *Charles Wager*. It was there join'd by a Squadron of *Dutch* Ships of War, and seem'd to portend some Enterprize of great Importance; but it afterwards appeared that the *Dutch* Squadron was neither *viſtalled*, nor otherwise *provided*, for any Expedition, and the Admiral Himself declared that He had no Orders to attend the *Engliſh* Fleet any farther. Having therefore kept us Company for some Months, and participated in our *naval Diversions*, They sail'd back to *Holland*, and our own Ships soon after return'd to their respective Harbours.

We were told, indeed, that this PROVISIONAL FLEET, as it was then call'd, struck such a Terror into the Hearts of our Enemies, that We soon * “heard of their making Advances, coming into Concessions, abating in their Demands, removing Obstacles, giving agreeable Assurances, and doing the utmost could be expected to shew their Inclination to renew the antient Amity subsisting between the two Crowns.” Nay, it was strongly insinuated, in the same Paper, that the Preservation of *Jamaica*, as well as our own Coasts from an Invasion, the Sovereignty of the Seas, the Freedom of our Commerce, and even the Security of our present Establishment, were owing to this formidable Armada, which frightened our Enemies

* The *London Journal*, of Oct. 1729. or the *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 173.

nemies out of their Designs, and at last produced the glorious Treaty of *Seville*.

But here it deserves a short Remark that, during these Exploits at *Spithead*, a * DAUPHIN was born in *France*, which broke the *Spanish* Faction in that Kingdom, and had certainly some Influence on the Court of *Spain*, if They could want any Motives to accept of Terms so advantageous to Them, as were stipulated by *that Treaty*.

Thus far the State of our Affairs was, in some Measure, brought down about four Years ago in a † *little Piece*, occasioned by the Publication of the *Treaty* before-mentioned, and some †† *Observations* upon it. This gave Rise to new Disputes, of which I am now to give some Account.

It cannot be thought wonderful that the *Court Writers* and their *Patrons*, who triumph'd so much the Year before on the *meer Project*, or *Draught of a Treaty*, should discover the same Spirit of Exultation upon procuring a *formal Treaty*, actually sign'd; which the *† *Writer* before me observes is *beyond the Reach of the most artful Malice*; though there was still wanting the Accession of *one Power*, whose Consent was most necessary to the putting it in Execution; for as the Introduction of 6000 *Spanish* Forces into the strong Places of *Tuscany*, *Parma* and *Placentia*, instead of 6000 *Neutrals* stipulated by the *Quadruple Alliance*, was the Basis of the *Seville Treaty*, the Concurrence of the *Emperor*, to whom the *Feodality of those States* belonged, was certainly requisite to the amicable Execution of it, according to the Doctrine of the *Enquiry* itself, where it is asserted ** *that HE*

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* *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 177.

† *A short View of the State of Affairs*, &c. since published in the *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 245.

†† *Observations upon the Treaty concluded at Seville*, &c. Printed for *Roberts* in the same Year.

*† *Id.* p. 7.

** *Enquiry*, p. 9.

LONE was capable of disturbing it; and yet He was not so much as complimented, in the *Treaty*, with an Invitation to accede, as the *Dutch* again were by an express Article.

It was therefore thought expedient to usher *this Treaty* into the World with some explanatory *Observations* upon it. They could not help foreseeing that their own Arguments upon *this Subject* were capable of being turned very strongly against Them. They knew very well that the *Author of the Enquiry* had been instructed, but three Years before, to alarm the *British Nation* with the formidable Projects, in Favour of † *Don Carlos*, even so far as *universal Monarchy*. They could not forget that the Author of the * *British Journal*, (who now makes so shining a Figure in the *Free Briton*) but a few Months before represented the Establishment of *this Prince* in *Italy* as a Point of such dangerous Consequence, that it was opposed at the Congresses of *Cambray* and *Soissons*, by all the principal Powers of *Europe*; particularly *Great Britain*;

“ Since, if *Don Carlos* should ever succeed to
 “ *Tuscany*, *LEGHORN*, the Mart of our *Mediterranean*
 “ Trade, will be in his Possession; and
 “ consequently *Spain* will have Power, at any Time,
 “ to deprive us of Commerce in the *Levant*, as
 “ well as the *West Indies*.

“ In which Case, says He, it will be nearly the
 “ same, as if we give up *Gibraltar* and *Portmahon*;
 “ because those Places will be of little Service to
 “ our *Mediterranean* Commerce, when the Marts
 “ of that Trade shall intirely exclude us from all
 “ Traffick.

This, I say, was the Doctrine advanced by the Author of the *British Journal*, in the Month
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† *Enquiry*, p. 22. 28, 86.
nal of Jan. 4, 1728-9; or the *Crafsman*, vol. 5. p. 80.

* See the *British Jour-*

of *January* 1728-9; and maintain'd, in another Place, by an *eminent Statesman*, who had the Honour of conducting our foreign Negotiations for several Years together; but a new Turn of Affairs, a few Months afterwards, laid Them under a Necessity of recanting these Arguments in the fullest Manner, and extolling that *very Succession*, which They had so lately condemn'd, as * *the Master-string, which They had touch'd with Success, and one of the best good Fortunes, which could befall this Nation.*

However, such glaring Contradictions from the same Mouths, and in so short a Course of Time, were thought to require some farther Apology, before the *Parliament* met. It was upon this Occasion, that the *Observations* were published, and dispersed thro' the Kingdom by *Authority*, as I remember.—Now, the principal Arguments in *this Piece*, are reducible to the following Heads;

First, † “ That *Great Britain* will be a considerable Gainer by *this Variation*, as We are freed from the Engagement We were before under, of paying one *third Part of the Expence*, which would have been requisite for maintaining *neutral Garrisons* in the *Dutchies of Tuscany and Parma.*

Secondly, *† “ That had the Succession to *Tuscany and Parma* been left open, all *Italy*, considering the Strength of the *Emperor* in that Country, must have probably fallen into his Hands, or at least into such Hands as must have had an entire Dependance on *Him* ;” with some very severe Reflections on his *Imperial Majesty*, as a Prince, “ who had made but ill Returns of Gratitude to *this Nation*, for having already contributed

* The *British Journal* sign'd *Thomas Potts*, published *Aug.* 1729; or the *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 101.

† *Observations*, p. 12.

*† *Ib.* p. 9.

“tributed to his Grandeur in that Part of the
“World.

And thirdly, * “That the *Emperor* cannot
“reasonably take Offence at *this Stipulation*, being
“Himself under previous Engagements, by the
“*Quadruple Alliance*, to make the Succession of
“*Don Carlos* effectual. — Neither can the *Vari-*
“*ation*, made by the *present Treaty*, of *Spanish*
“instead of *Swiss Garrisons*, justify, in Reason
“and good Sense, his *Imperial Majesty’s* not con-
“senting to it, unless He can shew that He may
“be prejudiced by *that Alteration*.

To the *first* of these Arguments it was readily
answer’d, † that the Charge of maintaining 2000
Men in *Italy*, for some Time, ought not to be
put in Ballance against the Dangers We should run
of involving our selves in a War, by undertaking
to effectuate the Introduction of *Spanish* Troops,
and to guaranty this Succession for ever, *† *so that*
it may rest secure and exempt from ALL EVENTS.

—It might have been added, that this Plea of
Frugality was somewhat improperly urged at a
Time, when the Nation was at the Expence of
maintaining so many numerous Bodies of Men,
both Abroad and at Home, without the same
Reason.

The *second Argument* is built on the formidable
Power of the *Emperor*, which was the fashionable
Doctrine at that Time; and from thence it was
argued that *this Variation* was necessary to prevent
his over-running all *Italy*. In Answer to This it
was observed by the Gentlemen, on the *other Side*,
†† that if his *Imperial Majesty* was really so strong
in *those Parts* as He was represented, He would
be able to give such an Oppolition to the Execu-

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* *Observations*, p. 10.

† *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 266.

*† See the *Treaty*, Art. 9, 10, 11, 12.
vol. v. p. 265, 289.

†† *Craftsman*

tion of the *Treaty*, as would plunge us in the greatest Difficulties. But They went farther, and desired to take the contrary of This for granted.—

† “ Let us suppose (*says one of these Writers*) “ that the Introduction and Establishment of the “ *Spaniards* in *Italy* should be made with so superior a Power, that the *Emperor* and *Princes* concern’d are forc’d to submit upon *our Terms*, instead of making *their own*; will the Difficulties “ be all removed? Will all the Inconveniencies to “ *Great Britain*, with which *this Treaty* may be “ attended, vanish away? They certainly will not. “ *Our Measures* are so wisely taken, that the “ easiest and shortest Manner of effectuating them “ is likewise the easiest and shortest Way to render “ *the little We have stipulated for our selves* precarious.

But, *thirdly*, though the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* was recommended, under the last Article, as a necessary Expedient to curb the *Emperor’s* exorbitant Power; yet We were likewise told, a little paradoxically, that *He could not reasonably take Offence at it; nor justify his not consenting to it; unless He could shew that He might be prejudiced by that Alteration*. Now this very Concession, as the *Country Gentlemen* observed, was in Effect giving up the whole Cause; since his *Imperial Majesty* might easily shew that *He should be prejudiced by such an Alteration*; and here, indeed, lies the whole Strefs of the Argument upon this Point.

It was allowed, on the *Country Side*, that the *Emperor* was a Party in the *Quadruple Alliance*, which established *this Succession*, and had thereby engaged to make it effectual. But They could not agree with the *Observer* and his *Patrons*, concerning the *Variation* in Dispute, for several Reasons, which I will sum up in as few Words as possible.

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In the *first Place*, They apprehended that supposing *this Alteration* not to be prejudicial to the Interests of his *Imperial Majesty*; yet that the * *Manner* of making it, without his *Consent*, and by Way of *Triumph* over Him, as a great Fetch in Politicks, would be thought a Reflection upon his *Honour*, at least, and might be attended with fatal Consequences.

But They likewise undertook to prove that the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* would be really prejudicial both to the *Emperor* and the *Empire*, even according to the *Observer's* Method of Reasoning; for He plainly intimated that one Design of the *Seville Treaty* was to restrain the *Emperor's* Power in *Italy*; and consequently it was *his Interest* to defeat that Design, however it might be the Interest of *others* to put it in Execution.

This avow'd End of the *Seville Treaty* was aggravated by *another*, which was likewise cry'd up by the *ministerial Writers* as a *Masterpiece of Politics*; I mean the Separation of *Spain* from the *Emperor*, and thereby dissolving the *Vienna Alliance*, which had been represented so very advantageous to the *latter*. Did not This affect the Interest of his *Imperial Majesty*; or could it be reasonably expected that He would not resent it?

Nay, the *Country Party* went still farther, and I think demonstrated that the Variation from *Neutral* to *Spanish Troops* (without insisting on the *Affront*, or having any Regard to the *Vienna Alliance*) was highly prejudicial both to the *Emperor* and the *Empire*; for the *neutral Troops*, stipulated by the *Quadruple Alliance*, were designed not only to secure the † *eventual Succession* of *Don Carlos*, but likewise the *Rights of Sovereignty established in the EMPEROR and EMPIRE over these States*. Now
this

* *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 264.
Treaties, vol. iv. p. 57.

† *Collection of Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 285.

this Part of the Condition was intirely revers'd by the *Variation* in Dispute; and the *Observer's* Argument, upon this Head, was of Course reduced to the following Absurdity; * “ that when a *mutual Security* is given and accepted by *two Parties*, for making good a Bargain, this Security “ may be taken from *one of the Parties* against his “ Consent, and the Benefit of it be wholly apply'd “ to the *other*, and yet no Prejudice be done to “ the *former*.

To This it was added, by the Writers on the *Country Side*, that his *Imperial Majesty* appeared very plainly to look upon the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* in this Light, by refusing to consent to it, whilst He was under so beneficial an Alliance with *Spain*, and *† even suffering Himself to be disunited from *that Crown* rather than comply. His Reason for This was very obvious; since if the Court of *Spain* had no other Design than to secure the Dutchies of *Tuscany* and *Parma* for *Don Carlos* according to the *Quadruple Alliance*, it is certain that *neutral Troops* would have been effectual for that Purpose; nay, more effectual than *Spanish Troops*, if We may believe the *Enquiry*, where the †† NEUTRAL GARRISONS, appointed by the *Quadruple Alliance*, are call'd the great *Bulwarks of the Succession of Don Carlos to Tuscany*; but their resolute Perseverance in desiring and insisting on *Spanish Garrisons* gave his *Imperial Majesty* just Grounds to apprehend some farther View; and one of the Writers on the *Country Side* seems to be pretty right in his Conjectures, upon this Occasion.

** “ We all know, *says He*, how precious the “ Possessions of *Italy* are to the *Imperialists*; how “ much the Point, to which They are arrived in “ that Country, of Dominion, Power, and In-
“ fluence,

* *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 287.

*† *Ib.* p. 264.

†† *Enquiry*, p. 25.

** *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 288.

"fluence, hath been always the chief Object of
 "their Policy.—Now will it be at all strange,
 "if They look on the *Variation* made in the *Qua-*
 "druple *Alliance* as a Measure taken to give
 "Them a *Rival* in that Country, where They
 "are at present indisputably the *superior Power*?
 "Will not these Garrisons of *Spaniards*, preten-
 "ded to be placed there for the Security of the
 "eventual Succession of *Don Carlos*, make Them
 "look on *Parma*, *Placentia*, *Portoferraio*, and
 "*Leghorn*, as so many Places of Arms, put into
 "the Hands of an *old Enemy*, an *unfaithful Ally*,
 "and a *certain Rival*? May They not apprehend
 "that neither Pretences, nor Means will be want-
 "ing, if the Treaty of *Seville* hath its Effect, to
 "introduce greater Numbers of *Spanish*, and even
 "*French* Troops into the Heart of *Italy*, and to
 "serve the *Emperor* as *Ferdinand the Catholick*
 "served *Lewis the 12th*, in Consequence of the
 "silly Partition, to which the *latter* consented.

In another Piece, the Consequences of the *Seville Treaty* are farther explained and foretold.

† "It is said, that *France* and *England* are
 "Guaranties for the *Emperor's* Dominions in *Italy*
 "against any Encroachments, which *Spain* may
 "attempt to make upon them.

"I answer, that the Purposes of the *Quadruple*
 "*Alliance* would have been effectually secured by
 "*neutral Troops*; but it is extremely probable that
 "the Introduction of *Spaniards* will be followed
 "by Invasions on the *Emperor's* Dominions; for
 "though the Introduction of only 6000 *Spaniards*
 "is stipulated, yet if They are put in Possession
 "of *Leghorn*, They may admit as many more as
 "They please by the Help of their *Fleet*, which
 "is large enough for that Purpose, and will be
 "as

† *The Case of the Hessian Forces, &c.* since published in the *Craftsman*, vol. vi. p. 311.

“ as good as a Bridge between *Italy* and *Spain*.
 “ In this Case, *France* will not be very forward to
 “ execute their Engagements of Guaranty in the
 “ *Emperor's* Behalf; and if *England* does, she
 “ must lose her Trade to *Spain* and *Leghorn*. If
 “ *France* should think fit to quarrel with the *Em-*
 “ *peror*, They would encourage *Spain* to invade
 “ his *Italian* Dominions; and when the *Emperor*
 “ complains of it, They will, without much Diffi-
 “ culty, (according to the modern Way of inter-
 “ preting the Obligations of Treaties) find out some
 “ Act or other of the *Emperor*, which They will
 “ alledge as a Reason for his having forfeited a
 “ Right to *that Guaranty*.

Upon the whole, it was concluded by *these Writers* that his *Imperial Majesty* would not consent to the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons*, unless He should be brought into it by † *another Expedient*, which might prove equally productive of bad Consequences; I mean our Guaranty of the PRAGMATIC SANCTION.

They likewise observed, with too much Reason, that as the Reconciliation of *Spain* and the *Emperor*, by the *first Vienna Treaty*, was the luckiest Circumstance, which could possibly happen to us at that Time, and ought to have excited our Joy, instead of alarming us with such a terrible Panick; so They apprehended * *that the Separation of those two Courts would be followed by a new Union between France and Spain more formidable, to Us than That, which We had dissolved.*

We were told, indeed, *† *that if Spain should presume to break the Bounds of Power in Italy, there are formidable Princes will rise in Opposition; perhaps OUR SELVES.* But to This it was answer'd, that

† *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 292.

* *Craftsman*, vol. vi. p. 308.

*† *British Journals of Aug. 1729, or the Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 100.

that besides the ridiculous Employment of being always *doing and undoing*, France might recover so much Strength, and the *Emperor* be so far reduced by *these Measures*, that it would not be in our Power to set Matters upon their right Foot again. Upon this Supposition, *one of the Writers on the Country Side* made the following Observation, which deserves particular Attention at this Time.

†† “ If the whole Weight of national Vengeance is ever to fall, it ought surely to crush
 “ Those, who precipitate their Country, by a long
 “ Series of Blunders and Mistakes, into such a
 “ terrible *Dilemma*, that We cannot observe our
 “ *Treaties*, without being exposed to fight against
 “ our *general Interests*, and without finding, when
 “ We return to them, that the *Weakness* of our
 “ *Allies* and the *Strength* of our *Enemies* are the
 “ Works of our own *Hands*.

I believe This will be thought sufficient to explain the Reasonings on *both Sides*, concerning the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* into *Italy*, † *which made one of the principal Stipulations of the new Treaty*, as the *Observer* very frankly acknowledged. But it was natural to enquire what Terms We had obtained for *our selves*, in Return for such valuable Obligations on the Court of *Spain*.

To satisfy this just Expectation, We were assured by the *Observer* * “ that our *Possessions* a-
 “ broad were secured to us, beyond all Possibility
 “ of Doubt, or Cavil; that all our Privileges and
 “ Advantages in *Commerce* were re-established upon
 “ the Foot of former *Treaties*; and that immediate Reparation was stipulated to our *Mer-*
 “ *chants* for all the Damages They had suffered
 “ at any Time, contrary to the *Treaties* of *U-*
 “ *trecht*, or any other *Treaties*, which subsisted
 F between

†† *Crispian*, vol. v. p. 291.
 on the *Treaty of Seville*, p. 8.

† *Observations*
 Id. p. 14.

“ between *England* and *Spain* to that very Day.

But the *Writers on the other Side* could not find any Articles, or Words in the *Treaty*, which could be fairly interpreted so as to justify these Assurances, or to deserve those Encomiums, which were bestowed upon it.

They observed that the *Spaniards* were so far from having renounced their Pretensions to *Gibraltar*, or recogniz'd our Right to the Possession of it, that it is not so much as mentioned through the whole *Treaty*; and it hath been since confess'd by an *honourable Gentleman*, in an high Station, † *that if We had offered to mention any Thing about Gibraltar, the Spaniards would have broke off all farther Negotiations.* We were likewise told by one of his *Advocates*, *that Gibraltar was an old Sore, and that our Ministers were desirous to touch it tenderly*; That is, the Court of *Spain* would not admit of any Words in the *Treaty*, which would annihilate their Pretensions, and did not design to include our Possession of *that Place* in their general Guaranty of *all his Majesty's Kingdoms, States and Dominions.* How therefore could it be said with Truth, as the *Observer* affirm'd, that *We had a very full Acknowledgment, on the Part of Spain, of our Right to Gibraltar and the Island of Minorca*; or *that those Possessions were secured to us, beyond all Possibility of Doubt, or Cavil*; when We had obtained no other Security for Them, than what was before complained of in the *Preliminaries*, the *Convention of the Pardo*, and the *Provisional Treaty*? I mean, a Confirmation of all former *Treaties*, and consequently That of *Madrid* in the Year 1721, upon which the *Spaniards* ground their Claim to the Restitution of *Gibraltar*?

They likewise apprehended that the Provisions made in this *Treaty* for the future Security of our
Commerce,

† *Craftsman*, vol. vi. p. 38.

Commerce, and Reparation to our *Merchants* for their past Sufferings, would prove ineffectual. These Provisions were, that * *Commissaries* should be appointed on the Part of their *Britannick* and *Catholick* Majesties, who should assemble at the Court of *Spain*, to examine and decide all Differences upon these Heads; with an express Stipulation, that *They* should punctually finish their Commission within the Space of three Years from the Day of signing the present Treaty, without any farther Delay, on any Motive, or Pretext whatever.

It was apprehended, I say, on the *Country Side*, that these Provisions would be very liable to Evasion, by the *Distance of Place*, where the *Commissaries* were to meet, the *Length of Time*, allowed for this Enquiry, and the several Points, of which it was to consist; particularly † “ the Pretensions “ of his *Catholick Majesty* to the Restitution of “ the Ships taken in the *Mediterranean*, in the “ Year 1718; an Article, which may be so cast “ up by the *Spanish Commissaries* as to overbalance “ the Account of the *British Merchants*, by several hundred thousand Pounds.

“ On the *other Side* it was asserted, that “ †† “ the Restitution of our Losses since *June 1727* “ was to be *immediate* and *forthwith*, as well as “ the Introduction of the *Spanish Garrisons* was “ to be *without Loss of Time*; and that the Affair “ of the *Merchants* stood PRIOR in the Treaty to “ the *Tuscan Affair*, and, so far as it was to be “ *without Loss of Time*, must have the Preference; “ nay, if it was not performed *immediately*, no “ thing was obliged to be done in Favour of *Don Carlos*.

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Indeed,

* *Collection of Treaties*, vol. iv. p. 204.

† *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 270. †† The *Free Briton* extraordinary, in Answer to the *Short View*; printed for *Peele*, in the Year 1730, p. 45.

Indeed, it was reasonable enough to expect that the *Spaniards* should have been obliged to make our *Merchants* Reparation for their Losses, before We gratify'd Them in so favourite a Point as the Introduction of *Don Carlos*. But though the Article of *Reparation* happened to stand prior in the Treaty to the *Tuscan Affair*, as this Writer most sagely observed, yet the Adjudication of the former being left to *Commissaries*, who had three Years allowed to finish their Enquiry, and the latter being to be effectuated without Loss of Time, it was easy to perceive which would have the Preference; and This furnished one Objection, of no small Weight, against the Treaty itself; in which * “ We seemed to make just such a Bargain, as “ We made in the *Quadruple Alliance*; when We “ put *Sicily*, and all that the *Emperor* had to expect from our *Friendship*, into his Hands immediately; although the reciprocal Part, to be performed by Him, was to be a Work of Time; “ and although We had not received Satisfaction “ from Him in some Points, about which We were “ extremely solicitous.

These Reasonings without Doors, concerning the Treaty of *Seville*, had likewise the Honour to be strengthened by the Arguments of several noble Lords and Gentlemen of great Distinction, within Doors; particularly in the *House of Peers*, where the following Motions were made; viz.

Die Martis 27 Jan. 1729.

Moved to resolve † “ that the Agreement in “ the Treaty of *Seville* to effectuate the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* into *Tuscany* and *Parma*, is a manifest Violation of the fifth Article of “ the *Quadruple Alliance*, tends to involve the “ Nation

* *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 293.

† *Hist. Register*, vol. xv. p. 202.

" Nation in a dangerous and expensive War, and
 " to destroy the Ballance of Power in *Europe*.

" *After Debate, the Question was put upon the*
 " *said Motion, and it was resolved in the Negative.*

Moved to resolve " that our Right of Sovereignty, Dominion, Possession and Propriety to
 " *Gibraltar*, and the Island of *Minorca*, is not ascertain'd by the Treaty of *Seville*, so as to extinguish the Claims and Pretensions set up by
 " the *Spaniards*, which were followed by an actual Siege, since the Session of those valuable Places by the Treaty of *Utrecht*.

" *After Debate, the Question was put thereon,*
 " *and resolved in the Negative.*

Moved to resolve " that the Stipulations in the
 " Treaty of *Seville*, for repairing the Losses of
 " our *Merchants*, are insufficient and precarious.

" *After Debate, the Question was put thereupon,*
 " *and it was resolved in the Negative.*

Then it was proposed, by some *other Lords*, to resolve " that the Treaty of Peace, Union and
 " Friendship, concluded at *Seville* the 9th of November last, doth contain all necessary Stipulations for maintaining and securing the Honour,
 " Dignity, Rights, and Possessions of the Crown;
 " and that all due Care is taken therein for the
 " Support of the Trade of the Kingdom, and for
 " repairing the Losses suffered by the *Merchants*.

" *After Debate, the Question was put thereupon,*
 " *and it was resolved in the Affirmative; upon*
 " *which several Lords entered their * Protest against*
 " *it, with their Reasons at large, which deserve*
 " *particular Notice at this Time.*

I shall now proceed, according to the Method proposed, to a few short Remarks on the Effects of *this Treaty*.

In the first Place, it is observable that his Imperial

rial Majesty was so far from looking on the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* into *Tuscany* and *Parma* as a trifling Variation from the *Quadruple Alliance*, according to the Doctrine of the *Court Writers*, that He resented both the *Matter* and the *Manner* of it in the strongest Terms, as a downright *Infraction of Treaties*, derogatory to his *Honour*, and injurious to his *Interests*, as well as the Rights of the *Empire*. He ordered his *Ministers* at several Courts to remonstrate against it as such; and sent a † *Commissorial Decree* to the Diet at *Ratisbon*; in which, having vindicated his own Conduct to the *States of the Empire*, there assembled, with Relation to *Don Carlos*, He speaks of the *present Stipulation* in the following Manner. —

“ But contrary to all Expectation, a particular
 “ Treaty hath been concluded at *Seville*, between
 “ the Crowns of *Spain, France, and Great Britain*;
 “ the 9th and subsequent Articles of which (*rela-*
 “ *ting to the Spanish Garrisons*) cannot but raise
 “ the highest Indignation; because the most essen-
 “ tial Bands of human Society are therein broken,
 “ and if *Christian Powers* pretend thus to dispose
 “ of the Estates of *third Persons*, all Confidence
 “ and good Faith ought to be banished out of
 “ the World. Besides, They have no Regard to
 “ former *Treaties*, nor to the last *Preliminary Ar-*
 “ *ticles*, which were acknowledged by *both Parties*
 “ as the Groundwork of the Negotiations for the
 “ general Peace, and as the only Counterpoise to
 “ an exorbitant Power, that was design’d to be
 “ erected in *Europe*. They have no Attention to the
 “ *Acts of Guaranty*, that have been delivered. They
 “ dispose of the Rights and Territories of the *Em-*
 “ *pire* as They please, even in the Life-time of
 “ the *lawful Possessors*. They set so little a Value
 “ upon the *Emperor and Empire*, that They would

not

† *Historical Register*, vol. xv. p. 134.

“ not so much as ask their *Consent* in an *Affair*,
 “ that was properly their own, though *such Consent*
 “ was made necessary by the *Alliance of London*.
 “ —If therefore *such Conduct* takes Place, and the
 “ *new Allies* persist therein, We shall hereafter see
 “ *Might* overcome *Right*, and *Engagements* tram-
 “ pled on at Pleasure; and whatever the *new Allies*
 “ shall judge to be most convenient will always be
 “ most just, without any Regard to *Things*, or
 “ *Persons*.

His *Imperial Majesty* likewise represents to the
Germanick Body, as a Merit to Himself, * “ that
 “ the Fear of being abandon’d by his Ally, the
 “ King of *Spain*, was not capable of making Him
 “ take the least Step, that could prejudice *his Dig-*
 “ *nity*, and That of the *Empire*.

The Court of *Vienna* did not content Them-
 selves, like some *other Politicians*, with shewing
 their Resentments in *Words* and *Appearances* only ;
 but actually pour’d a large Army into *Italy* with
 Orders to oppose the Execution of the *Treaty*, and
 found Means to maintain Them there all the fol-
 lowing Summer, notwithstanding the Suggestions
 of the *Court-Party*, and the wise Precautions We
 took, by an † *Act of Parliament*, to prevent the
 Subjects of this Kingdom from lending Him any
 Money.

When the Allies of *Seville* found the *Emperor* in
 Earnest, and fully determined to stand upon his
 Defence, They began to halt and beat a Parley.
 The Cabinets of *Europe* were again employed in
 framing *Expedients* ; Couriers were continually pas-
 sing from Court to Court ; and the publick Prints
 amus’d us with nothing but new Plans, or new Re-
 ports

* *Historical Register*, vol. xv. p. 134.

† See an Act, to prohibit his Majesty’s Subjects, to lend any
 Sums of Money to any foreign Prince, State, or Potentate, &c.
 in the Year 1730.

ports of Accommodation ; whilst a large Fleet lay in the Road of *Barcelona*, and a numerous Body of *Land Forces* were assembled on the neighbouring Coasts, ready to embark upon the first Notice for the intended Expedition. But his *Imperial Majesty* having rejected all the Propositions made to Him, for acceding to the Treaty of *Seville*, and seeming determin'd to abide Extremities, rather than consent to their Measures ; that Summer wore out in Negotiation only, and the *Spanish Armada* retir'd to their Harbours, without any Action, like our Fleet at *Spithead*, the Year before.

The Introduction of *Don Carlos* with *Spanish Troops* into *Italy* being thus protracted ; the Performance of the Articles, in our Favour, was likewise suspended. The *Spaniards* not only continued the Blockade of *Gibraltar*, in the most rigorous Manner, so as to cut off all Communication with the Country ; but likewise projected some *new Works* for annoying our Ships in the Bay, which have been since finished. Instead of making our *Merchants* any *immediate Reparation*, by Virtue of that *Priority* in the Treaty, which the *Court-Writers* discovered, They did not so much as nominate *Commissaries*, on their Part, for adjusting those Losses ; and seem'd to think Themselves free from all Engagements towards us, till the Stipulations, in Favour of *Don Carlos*, were effectually put in Execution.

Thus did Affairs continue in a doubtful Situation between *Peace* and *War*, as They had continued for several Years past, till the Season of *Parliament* in *Great Britain* came round again ; That is, till the Beginning of the Year 1731 ; about which Time, a private Negotiation at *Vienna*, between *Great Britain* and the *Emperor*, began to get Air, and was first hinted to the Publick in the famous *HAGUE LETTER*, printed in the *Craftsman* ;

* *Craftsman* ; which, having since received a *judicial Censure*, I am not at Liberty to quote, tho' it would be of great Use to my present Purpose ; but as it was chiefly built on the 4th Article of the *Hanover Treaty*, and the bad Consequences, which might attend any *Breach* of it, I must content my self with laying *that Article* before the Reader. It runs in the following Terms, *viz.*

† “ And as the said *three most serene Kings*
 “ are resolved to bind more and more closely the
 “ strict Union, that subsists amongst Them, by all
 “ possible Tokens of *good Faith* and *mutual Con-*
 “ *fidence*, They have reciprocally agreed, not only
 “ to enter into *no Treaty, Alliance, or Engagement*
 “ whatever, which may in any Manner whatever
 “ *be contrary to the Interests of each other* ; but even
 “ faithfully to *communicate to each other the Propo-*
 “ *sals, that may be made to Them*, and not to take,
 “ upon what may be proposed, any *Resolution*, o-
 “ therwise than in *Concert together*, and after a *joint*
 “ *Examination* of what may conduce to their *com-*
 “ *mon Interests*, and be proper for maintaining the
 “ Ballance of *Europe*, which is so necessary to be
 “ preserved for the Good of the *general Peace*.

In less than three Months after the *Hague Letter* was published, a Treaty of Peace and Alliance was actually concluded at *Vienna* between the *Emperor* and the King of *Great Britain*, in which the *States General* were likewise included ; but neither *France*, nor *Spain* were so much as mentioned in it ; which seem'd to be somewhat extraordinary as to the latter, at least, since the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* into *Italy*, with the *Emperor's* Consent, made one of the principal Stipulations of this *new Treaty* ; nay, what is still more surprizing,

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* *Craftsman*, No. 235. Sat. Jan. 2. 1730-1.

† *Collection of Treaties*, vol. iv. p. 149. *Craftsman*, vol. vii. p. 223.

it was with extreme Difficulty that They were brought into it at last, and even then not without insisting on several Alterations in the *Act of Approbation* ; one of which, if I do not forget, was that the Introduction of *Don Carlos* with 6000 *Spanish Troops* into *Italy* should be effectuated PREVIOUSLY to the Execution of any Engagements on their Part, however They might stand PRIOR in the Treaty of *Seville* ; which, by the Way, was concluded above a Year and an half before. The *Dutch* were still more backward in their Accession, and did not accede at last without some * wise Restrictions. As for the Court of *France*, They were so far from listening to any Sollicitations on this Head, that They exerted their utmost Endeavours to prevent the Concurrence of *Spain*. Nay, They express'd such a Resentment both against the Treaty itself, and the Manner of negotiating it, that We apprehended nothing less than an Invasion from *Dunkirk*, where some Troops were assembled. This struck us, all on a Sudden, with such a Terror, that the Coasts of *Kent* were immediately cover'd with Regiments of Horse, Foot, and Dragoons, who were order'd to march thither, with the utmost Precipitation, from all Parts of the Kingdom ; and the Fluctuation, which such an Alarm naturally occasioned in our Stocks, afforded the Caterpillars of the *Alley* a plentiful Harvest.

However, these Apprehensions being soon dissipated, Sir *Charles Wager* was again dispatch'd to the Coasts of *Spain* with a large Squadron of *English* Ships, in order to wait upon *Don Carlos* and the *Spanish* Troops to his new Dominions. The *Admiral Ship* was fitted out in a most splendid and costly Manner, for the Reception of his serene Highness ; but after a Course of pompous Compliments

pliments and Visits between the *Commander of the Spanish Fleet* and our *Admiral*, upon his Arrival at *Cadiz*, and the same Honours having been afterwards paid him at the Court of *Seville*, his *Catholic Majesty* was pleased to discharge Him from the Trouble of taking *Don Carlos* under his Care, and required no more at his Hands than to convey the *Spanish Troops* to *Italy*, in Conjunction with his own *Admiral*. The combin'd Fleet accordingly set Sail from *Barcelona* in *October* 1731, and arrived at *Leghorn* the 26th of that Month.

As soon as the Court of *Spain* received Intelligence that their *Forces* were safely landed, and that * *every Thing, relating to the Introduction of Spanish Garrisons in Tuscany was finished*; the young Prince was sent after them by Land, as far as *Antibes*; for They chose to let him travel thro' *France*, rather than accept of those magnificent Accommodations, which had been provided for Him and his Retinue on board our Squadron, at so great an Expence. His Highness arrived at † *Leghorn* the 27th of *Dec.* following, and was received there with all possible Marks of Joy and Respect; especially by the *English Factory*, who erected a triumphal Arch in Honour of the Day. Soon after This, his Majesty received a Letter from the *Dutchess Dowager of Parma*, Guardian to *Don Carlos*, wherein †† she acquaints his Majesty with the due and happy Accomplishment of that Succession, desiring his Majesty's Acceptance of a *† MEDAL struck upon this Occasion, and expressing
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* See the *London Gazette*, for the Month of *Nov.* 1731.

† *London Gazette*, *Jan.* 1st. 1731-2.

†† See the *publick Papers* of the same Date.

*† It was said that this Medal contain'd the Effigies of *Don Carlos* on one Side, with this Inscription; *Carolus I. Borbonius-Farnesius, novus Dux PARMÆ & PLACENTIAE*; and on the Reverse, a royal Crown upon a Carpet, with this Device, *MOX VENIET*.

her Sense of his Majesty's Friendship to the Royal, Infante Duke, as well as to Herself; and of the great Share, that his Majesty hath had in this IMPORTANT EVENT.

About the same Time, Admiral *Wager* received a Present of the King of *Spain's* Picture set with Diamonds, to a great Value, for his Services in that glorious Expedition.

Don Carlos being thus established in his new Dominions, to the Satisfaction of their *Catholick Majesties*, and at our Expence, the ministerial Writers began to raise their Crests again, and promised us all, that our Hearts could wish from the Court of *Spain*, in Return for such high Obligations. — But before I proceed to the Effects of these Transactions, I must make a few Remarks on another Article of the *Vienna Treaty*.

For as the *Emperor* consented to this Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* into *Tuscany* and *Parma*, which He seem'd so resolutely determin'd to oppose with all his Might but a Year before; it must be concluded, that He likewise obtained some favourite Point for Himself; and That was our *Guaranty of the PRAGMATICK SANCTION*; the very Point, which was mark'd out and foretold by the *Country Writers* as the only Term, upon which We should be able to purchase the Accession of his *Imperial Majesty* to the Treaty of *Seville*. This was just hinted at before; but I must now beg Leave to cite the *Passage* at large, with the *Author's* Sentiments upon such an Expedient.

† “ But it will be said, perhaps, that We are
 “ brought into no Danger of a War with the *Em-*
 “ *peror*; that our wise Ministers have a Reserve
 “ still in their Power, and can make a Peace with
 “ his *Imperial Majesty*, whenever They please; that
 “ to effect it, nothing more will be necessary than
 “ to

“ to give *our Guaranty* to the Disposition, what-
 “ ever it be, which his Imperial Majesty hath made,
 “ or shall make of the *Austrian Dominions*.

“ Such an *Expedient* as This would, I doubt not,
 “ be soon pass’d (if the immediate Danger of a
 “ War press’d upon us) by *Those*, who think of
 “ nothing more than how to get over, by *annual*
 “ *Expedients*, the *annual Difficulties* They bring
 “ Themselves under ; without any Regard to the
 “ continual Charge and frequent Losses, which
 “ the Nation is obliged to support, by their Ma-
 “ nagement, or to the dangerous Consequences
 “ of their Measures. But Men, who think on
 “ wiser and honester Principles, would look on
 “ *such a Guaranty* as a Method of Cure very little
 “ preferable to the Disease it self.

“ His Imperial Majesty hath indeed given *his*
 “ *Guaranty* to the Succession of our Crown, esta-
 “ blish’d in the present, Royal Family ; but there
 “ would be no Parity between *such a Guaranty* as
 “ This, and the *Guaranty of a Succession*, the Na-
 “ ture of which may be known by the *Pragmatick*
 “ *Sanctions* ; but the Descent of which into any
 “ *particular Family* cannot be foreseen.

“ Who could answer, in this Case, that We
 “ might not give *our Guaranty* even to the ag-
 “ grandizing of *Don Carlos* ; which is an Event
 “ *our Politicians* have express’d their Apprehen-
 “ sions of in the strongest Terms, although They
 “ seem at present a little better reconciled to it?

“ Who could foresee the numberless Mischiefs,
 “ of which such a Disposition of the *Austrian*
 “ *Dominions* might be productive, if his Imperial
 “ Majesty should die, without *Issue male*? What
 “ Clashing of Interests might there not be, even in
 “ the *Imperial Family*, as well as in every Part of
 “ the *Empire*? To get clear of a War with *Spain*,
 “ We expose our selves to a War, which may
 “ com-

“ commence in *Italy*, and spread much farther.
 “ By *the Expedient*, now supposed, We might get
 “ clear of an immediate War in *Italy*; but We
 “ should stand in Danger of being involved, a little
 “ sooner, or a little later, in a War, which may di-
 “ stract *Germany* as much, and last as long as That
 “ of 1618, and kindle its Fires all over *Europe*.

The *Author of the Enquiry* reason'd, upon the same Principles, against *our Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction*, about two Years before, and applauded his late Majesty's Wisdom for refusing it, in the following Words. “ Certainly, no one can
 “ think but that it was wisely and happily judg'd
 “ to refuse a *Guaranty*, which might have been at-
 “ tended with so fatal Consequences; for as the
 “ *Emperor's Children* are now *Females* only; and
 “ the Influence of that Succession upon *Europe* must
 “ depend upon the Marriages of *these Females*;
 “ and as no one then knew to what *Princes* They
 “ might be hereafter married; it was wise in his
 “ Majesty not to oblige Himself to support a *Suc-
 cession*, which might possibly, by some future
 “ *Marriages*, become formidable to the rest of
 “ *Europe*, and fatal in the End to *Britain* itself.

This was the Language of the *Court*, and the Doctrine of the *Enquiry*, at the Beginning of the Year 1727, in order to justify the Treaty of *Hannover*, and the Measures, that had been taken against the Allies of *Vienna*. I must therefore beg Leave to recommend one Consideration to the *Author of that memorable Treatise*; who seem'd to be very
 “ angry, about five Years ago, with an Observation,
 † that He had been given up, in every material
Article, by BOTH PARTIES, and complain'd of it as groundless. This Complaint, among other Reasons, produced a * Reply from the Gentleman, who made the *Observation*; and it was generally
 thought

† *Craftsman*, vol. iv. p. 85.

* *Ib.* p. 259.

thought that He supported it very fully, by an Introduction of Particulars, as to the *main Points* then in Dispute; I mean the several Articles of the *secret, offensive Treaty of Vienna*, which was so strongly asserted in the *Enquiry*; for it did not then enter into any Body's Imagination, that We should ever consent to the *Introduction of SPANISH GARRISONS into Italy*, or become *Guaranties of the PRAGMATIC SANCTION*. But since the *Vicissitude of human Affairs*, the *Fluctuation of Power*, and the *Revolution of Politicks* have brought these Things to pass, I leave the *Gentleman* to determine, in his own Breast, *whether He is not now effectually given up in every material Article, which He either asserted, or justify'd in that Book*. I am willing to believe Him a Man of *great Sincerity*, and that He was led into Error meerly through *Misinformation*; but since his Book was set forth by Authority, as a Sort of *political Canon*, which the People were to receive for their *Rule of Faith*, and hath been made the Foundation of all our Disputes, for several Years together; it certainly behoves Him to review it once more, and compare it with our *late Measures*, as becomes a *candid Writer* and a *Lover of Truth*. But This is only by Way of Digression. Let us now proceed to other Matters, according to the Method laid down.

It must be confess'd that *this Treaty of Vienna* prevented an *immediate War*, and serv'd to keep Things together for some Time; but it was far from establishing a *firm and lasting Peace*; for, to speak in the softest Terms, there hath been a remarkable Coldness between *Us* and *France* ever since; and the Preparations in the Ports of *Spain* for equipping *another Armament*, the very next Spring, seem'd to give our *Ministers* such an Alarm, that a *Fleet* was fitted out here likewise in a great Hurry, and rendezvouz'd at the *Nore*, where it

continued

continued for some Time, under the Command of Sir George Walton. This, I say, seem'd to intimate that our Court had some Jealousy of the Design of the *Spaniards*; for as soon as certain Intelligence arriv'd that They were landed near *Oran*, the *Admiral* was ordered to strike his Flag, and the Ships return'd to their Harbours.

Immediately after This, the *ministerial Press* was delivered of another Pamphlet, intitl'd * *the natural Probability of a lasting Peace in Europe*; from whence it is necessary to quote a few Passages.

He begins with telling us that † “ We enjoy at present the *most perfect, universal and established Tranquility*. We behold not only *Great Britain* at Peace, and on the most amicable Terms with *all her Neighbours*, but all her Neighbours are at the same Time dispos'd in the strongest Manner to *live well with each other*. We are not only happy in a good Understanding with *other Nations*, but those Nations likewise are without Quarrels and Disputes *among Themselves*; so that as We have no Prospect of War, or Contention, by *Differences of our own*; neither are We likely to be drawn into Danger by the *Disagreements, the Ruptures, or Commotions of others*.

This, one would think, was sufficient in all Conscience; but He explains our Happiness more particularly in the next Paragraph.

“ This most advantageous Situation, *says He*, is what We have very seldom seen, what We hope will long continue, and what We conceive to be secured by the *most effectual, the best contrived Means in the World*. We cannot look back to any particular Period, within a long Course of Time, when *Europe* was blest with *such universal Quiet*, and with such reasonable Hopes of its *long extended Duration*. Almost every Peace,

“ that

" that hath been made in *Europe*, since the Resto-
 " ration of *Charles 2d*, seems to have been in its
 " Nature, as well as in its Consequence, no better
 " than a *short Cessation of Arms*; and whoever
 " looks into the *Treaties*, which were design'd to
 " compose the *Quarrels of Princes* then at Vari-
 " ance, may easily see their *Differences* far from
 " being *finisb'd*, and those *unfinisb'd Differences*
 " big with *new Calamities*. But We have now
 " the Happiness to see the PLAN OF POWER so
 " well design'd, the *Limits* so well bounded, and
 " so strongly fenc'd, the several Princes of *Europe*
 " so well satisfy'd with their *respective Conditions*,
 " so powerfully disposed to *live peaceably within*
 " *Themselves*, and so very far from being either
 " interested, or inclined to make *Encroachments on*
 " *their Neighbours*, that We may indulge all those
 " Pleasures, which good Minds are capable of
 " conceiving on so *agreeable a Prospect*; since no
 " Season ever beheld a *Peace more universal*, nor
 " did any Conjunction of Affairs ever promise a
 " *Peace more establish'd and lasting*.

Some Remarks upon *this Piece* were immedi-
 ately published in the † *Craftsman*; particularly on
 the NEW PLAN OF POWER, so highly extoll'd in
 the foregoing Paragraph.

This Writer profess'd Himself ready to acknow-
 ledge that " almost every Peace since the Restora-
 " tion (*and especially for SEVERAL YEARS PAST*)
 " seems to have been in its Nature, as well as in
 " its Consequence, no better than a SHORT CES-
 " SATION OF ARMS." He likewise confess'd,
 " that the PLAN OF POWER in *Europe* was cer-
 " tainly alter'd by two fundamental Articles of
 " our *late Treaties*; viz. the Introduction of *Don*
 " *Carlos* into *Italy*, and the Guaranty of the
 " *Pragmatick Sanction*." But He was very far from
 H " agree-

agreeing with *this Reasoner upon Probabilities*, that it had laid the Foundation of an *universal and establiſh'd Peace*; ſince it is well known that the Court of *France* was ſo far from diſcovering any Diſpoſition to guaranty the *Pragmatick Sanction*, that it was undoubtedly their Intereſt to oppoſe it; that They had actually oppoſed it already, as far as They could in the Way of *Negotiation*; and that, in all *Probability*, They would oppoſe it by *Force*, whenever the Contingency ſhould happen. — He likewiſe expreſs'd the ſame Apprehenſion from the new Settlement of *Don Carlos*, with Regard to the *Tranquility of Europe*, and ask the following remarkable Queſtions upon it. “ May not the
 “ ITALIAN DOMINIONS furniſh a Bone of Con-
 “ tention between *Germany* and *Spain*, in Times
 “ to come, as *Flanders* hath already done between
 “ *France* and the *States General*? May not theſe
 “ *Pretenſions* prove the Means of UNITING *France*
 “ and *Spain*, and involve *Great Britain* in a War
 “ to ſupport her Engagements? ”

The *Court Author* beforementioned (That is, Mr. *Walſingham*) was pleaſed to give theſe Queſtions a Reply in his next † *Free Briton*, and treated it as a ridiculous Suppoſition, “ that *France*
 “ and *Spain* ſhould join in Arms againſt the *Prag-*
 “ *matick Sanction*. The Intereſts of *France* and
 “ *Spain* (*says He*) are ſo far incompatible, in this
 “ Affair, that the *Pope* and *Turk* might as well be
 “ expected to join in a War for the utter Subver-
 “ ſion of the *Proteſtant Religion*.

He adds, by Way of Interrogation, * “ if the
 “ Crown of *Spain* had any Claims, any Demands
 “ upon the *Emperor* in *Italy*, can it be thought
 “ that This would unite the *French* and *Spaniards*
 “ together? — Would the Court of *France*
 “ think it worth their Trouble even to take away
 “ Power

“ Power from the House of *Austria*, if it were
 “ merely to add to the *Spanisk Power*? Or are
 “ not the *French* and *Spaniards* naturally as jea-
 “ lous of *each other*, as *either* of Them can be of
 “ the *House of Austria*? — And can it then be
 “ thought that They will ever UNITE, when their
 “ Interests always must be different?

What an excellent Head must *this Man* have to reason upon *Probabilities*, and judge of *future Contingencies*, who seems altogether ignorant of *actual Events*? For it was visible to every Body, of common Discernment, that an *Union* between *France* and *Spain* was very far advanced even at the Time, when He published this *Song of Triumph*; and, indeed, had been growing up ever since the Treaty of *Seville*, which naturally produced it, as the *Country Writers* justly observed, by dissolving the Alliance between *Spain* and the *Emperor*. He likewise seems to have forgot a certain Observation of his old Acquaintance, ROGER MANLEY, Esq; some Years before, concerning the *Queen of Spain*, viz. † “ that as she is a Princess of SPIRIT and
 “ AMBITION, she carried her Views yet farther,
 “ being very desirous to make her SON sole Mo-
 “ narch of LOMBARDY.” Now, if This is the true Character of her *Catholick Majesty*, let me ask our profound Politician, whether paving the Way for *Don Carlos* so far as We have done, could possibly have any *natural Tendency* to check her *Ambition*; or whether she could take a more *probable Method* of gratifying her *farther Views*, than by uniting with *FRANCE*, on a proper Opportunity. — But I am ashamed to comment any farther on a *Piece*, which appeared absurd enough of itself, when it was first published, and hath been lately ridicul’d in * so handsome a Manner. I shall therefore close

H 2

this

† *British Journal*, Jan. 4 h, 1728-9.
 Dec. 22, 1733.

* *Fog's Journal*,

this Head with an Observation or two, which naturally result from the State of the Case.

The precedent Transactions are sufficient to teach us how necessary it is for *Ministers and Governors of Kingdoms*, which have any *main Interest* at Stake, or any *great Point* at Heart, to keep it constantly in View, and to pursue it with inflexible Resolution. By these Means, We see, the Court of *Spain* hath at length effectuated the Succession of *Don Carlos* to the *Tuscan Dominions* through infinite Obstacles; and, if We may believe the *ministerial Writers*, against the Interests and Inclinations of all the Powers in *Europe*. By the same Means, his *Imperial Majesty* hath, in a Manner, extorted our *Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction*, which his *late* and his *present Majesty* thought fit to refuse so long. I sincerely wish that I had any Opportunity of congratulating my own Country on the same happy Issue of our Negotiations, with Respect to those *essential Points*, about which We have been contending for so many Years, and at so much Expence; but though the same Assiduity hath, no Doubt, been employed, and the same constant, invariable Regard hath been paid to *our Interests*, it does not yet appear that They have been crown'd with the same Success. It is true, indeed, that his *Imperial Majesty* hath at length consented to abolish the *Ostend Company*, and all Trade to the *East Indies* from the *Austrian Netherlands*; but This hath been confess'd, on *both Sides*, to be the *least material Article*, with Regard to *Us*; and every Body knows that it might have been effectually suppress'd at first for a Trifle not worth mentioning, in Comparison to those immense Sums, which it hath since cost us. Besides, I observed before that the Bustle We have made about *this Trade* hath set almost every Nation upon Schemes of the *same Kind*; and that

even

even the *Emperor* Himself is now pursuing a Plan for carrying it on in some other Part of the World, not prohibited by *Treaty*. Our principal Points therefore are the undisturb'd Possession of *Gibraltar* and the Island of *Minorca*; the Freedom of *Commerce*, and Reparation to our plunder'd *Merchants*. As to the *first*, I cannot possibly conceive how our Right to the Possession of these Places can be said to be effectually ascertain'd and secured, when the very *Treaty*, upon which the *Spaniards* ground their Pretensions to them, is recalled and confirm'd in all the subsequent *Treaties*, by which We are told They have renounc'd those Pretensions; especially, when it is farther considered that They have constantly refused to renounce Them specifically, and have even given us the most ocular Demonstration of their Intentions, by erecting Forts and other military Works to annoy our Garrison, as well as our Ships in the Bay. The Freedom of Commerce and Reparation to our Merchants are so closely interwoven together, that they may be properly considered under one Head; and what hath been done upon This? Why, the Time limited by the Treaty of *Seville*, for the Examination and Decision of that Affair, expired without any Thing being settled. Another Term of three Years was then agreed upon; above one Year of which is already lapsed, and I do not hear that the Merchants have yet received any Satisfaction. But as the *Commissaries*, on our Part, are now return'd, and the *Parliament* is just upon the Point of meeting, We shall soon know what They have done; and I heartily wish that a certain Gentleman's Prediction in the *House of Commons*, when the Treaty of *Seville* came first under Deliberation there, may not be verifi'd; viz. that the Execution of this Commission would cost the Nation more than the Merchants would ever get by it.— If therefore

We

We have not effectually insisted on either of these *great Points*, whilst the *dearest Interest* of Spain remain'd in Suspence, and must have remain'd so without our Assistance; how can We expect to obtain them, when We have given *that Pledge* out of our own Hands, and *Spain* stands no longer in Need of Us?

But it will be said perhaps, (nay, it hath been said in Effect already) that We could not purchase *Peace* at too dear a Rate, as our Circumstances then stood; and that We had better yield to any Terms than plunge the Nation into a *War*. If This was our Case, I should be glad to know why the same Considerations did not prevail long before; for if We had undertaken to effectuate the Introduction of *Don Carlos* with *Spanish* Garrisons into *Italy*, at the Congress of *Cambray*, instead of opposing it with so much Vigour, the Court of *Spain* would have had no Occasion to throw Themselves into the Arms of the *Emperor*; and if We had been happy enough, at the same Time, to discover that *the Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction* was only a Bugbear, that frighten'd us without any Reason, there is no Room to suppose that the *Emperor* would not have comply'd with the Demands of the *Spaniards*, upon *that Condition*, as readily as He hath done since. In this Case, I say, *Great Britain* would not only have saved an infinite Expence in sending out so many *naval Armaments* to all Parts of the World, keeping up *foreign Armies*, and paying *foreign Subsidies*, with all their *necessary Concomitants at home*; but might likewise have carried on her *Commerce* without Interruption, or such a continued Series of *Depredations*, as our *Merchants* have suffered for many Years past. Nay, if our *Ministers* had happen'd to make all these wise Discoveries at the Congress of *Soissons*, or even when the Treaty of *Seville*

was

was in Agitation, We might have avoided some Part of these Expences and Calamities; for it is directly said in the *Answer to the Imperial Decree* against *that Treaty*, published at *Ratisbon*, and said to be written by the *French Minister*, * “ that
 “ the Court of *Vienna* did, in some Measure, put
 “ the Allies of *Hanover* in the Way of the Nego-
 “ tiation, which now fills Them with Indignation
 “ and Resentment; and that nothing hath been
 “ done, but what the *Emperor* was very ready to
 “ do Himself, had CERTAIN CONDITIONS, essen-
 “ tial to the Interests of HIS HOUSE, been com-
 “ ply’d with.

But our greatest Misfortune is, that the very Measures We chose to take, for obtaining a *lasting Peace*, are likely to involve us in a *general War*; and what is still worse, after We have spent so many *Millions of Money*, suffered so many grievous Losses in our *Trade*, and made such *large Concessions*, in order to avoid it. This is what the *Country Party* have long ago foretold, and I am heartily sorry to find their Predictions so nearly accomplish’d; for it appears very plainly, from the foregoing Deduction, to what Causes the present Commotions in *Europe* are really owing; I mean to the Treaty of *Seville*, which opened a Way for the *Spaniards* into *Italy*, and to the last Treaty of *Vienna*, which compleated the Union between *France* and *Spain*, as the *other* laid a Foundation for it, by separating *Spain* from the *Emperor*.

How ridiculous therefore is it to argue, as *some Men* do, that the present War in *Europe* was occasioned meerly by the accidental Death of the late King of *Poland*, which *no human Wisdom could foresee*? It may be said, indeed, that the Demise of *that Prince* was the immediate Occasion of the Flames bursting out; but the combustible Matter

was

* *Historical Register*, vol. xv. p. 185.

was laid long before, and the least Spark was sufficient to set Fire to the Train. The Vacancy of the Throne of *Poland* happened to come first in the Way; but any other Accident in *Europe* would have had just the same Effect.

The Court of *Vienna* was so far from imputing the *present War* to the Death of *Augustus*, that They represented the * “ *Polish Election* as an Handle “ only for putting *those Designs* in Execution, “ which *France* had meditated long before the “ Throne of *Poland* became vacant.

Besides, it ought to be considered that although the particular Year, Month, or Day, on which King *Augustus* would die, could not be foreseen; yet it is well known that He was *above threescore Years of Age*, and in a *very infirm State of Health*. No wise People therefore would care to pay for an *Annuity of Peace upon such a Life*; and We ought, at least, to have been secured against a *Contingency*, which could not be very far off, according to the ordinary Course of Nature. But *Contingencies* are Things, which *some Men* seem intirely to neglect. They consider only the *present Time*; and if They can but make a Shift to put off the Evil for a Day, They seldom take any Thought for the *Morrow*.

I know it will be said, (as it hath been said before, upon other Occasions) that † the Judgment from the EVENT of Things meerly is not the Judgment of REASON. I grant that it is not meerly so; especially when We speak of fortuitous Events, which God only can foresee; though the Court Party have often founded their Triumphs upon such Accidents; and I will venture to affirm that no Men were ever more lucky in that Particular. But the Events We speak of, at present, are only such as flow from natural Causes; in the Fore-
fight

* See the Remarks on the Motives of the French King's Resolutions.

† Defence of the Enquiry, P. 35.

sight of which all political Wisdom consists. I believe the Gentlemen on the *Country Side* do not pretend to any *supernatural Light*, or *Gifts of Divination*; and yet That must be the Case, if all the *Events*, which They have foretold, are meerly *accidental*. If They had judg'd right upon *one* or *two Points* only, it might have been imputed to *Guess-work*, or *Chance*; but to be justified in their Opinion of publick Transactions, for seven or eight Years together, by the Consequences of them, in almost every Particular, is certainly owing to something more than a meer Run of *Luck*, and can proceed from nothing but a right Judgment of *Causes* and *Effects*.

But it may be said again, of what Use is it, at present, to tell us that *one Set of Gentlemen* had more Sagacity and Foresight than *another*? The *Events* of our late Transactions are now visible to every Body; the Nation is in Danger; and *what is to be done*? This, indeed, is a proper Question; but the Answer is not so easy. Things seem to be brought to such a Pass, that I wish it may not puzzle the ablest Heads in *England* to extricate us with Honour out of that Labyrinth of *Engagements*, in which We are unhappily involved.

We find ourselves oblig'd, by several *Treaties*, to assist the *Emperor*; if He should be attack'd; and it is said that We have been already call'd upon to perform *these Engagements*.

By the Treaty of *Seville*, We are ty'd down, in the strongest Manner, to secure *Don Carlos* in the Possession of his *Italian Dominions* for ever, *against ALL EVENTS*. His *Catkolick Majesty* alludes very plainly to *this Engagement* in his late complaisant Memorial to the King of *Great Britain*; where He acknowledges the *generous Part*, which his Majesty hath acted, with Regard to *Don Carlos*.

And if it should be true, as a Rumour flies about, that the Plan of Operations, which the *French* are now pursuing in *Italy*, was first chalk'd out by Us, in Case the *Emperor* should not make good his Engagements to *Spain*; what Part can We possibly take in *these Disputes*, without wounding our Honour, or betraying our Interest?

It it should be likewise true, as I have heard it whisper'd, that We promis'd *France* our Assistance, about *four Years ago*, to restore King *Stanislaus* to the Throne of *Poland*; whenever *Augustus* should dye, and that our *Minister* was even order'd to co-operate with the *French Minister* for that Purpose; if This, I say, is true, and We should have since given the *Emperor* any Encouragement to oppose the Election of *that Prince*, how are We to act upon the present Occasion?

In short, whichever Way We turn ourselves, or whatever Side We take, if We take any, We shall not only involve our selves in a dangerous and expensive War, but likewise incur the Reproach and Resentment of *one Side*, or the *other*; since *both* of Them think Themselves intitled to our Assistance,

If, to avoid these Difficulties, We chuse a State of *absolute Neutrality*, and leave the *opposite Powers* to dispute their own Quarrel among Themselves, the Consequence may be fatal to *Europe*, and at length involve *Us* in the common Calamity.

The Question therefore recurs, *what is to be done?* — *Or is any Thing to be done?* — Ought We to involve our selves in a *War*, in which We have *no particular Interest* concern'd? — Or shall We sit down in Quiet, and run the Hazard of seeing *Europe* become a Prey to the Arms of the *Conqueror*? — For my Part, I cannot pretend to answer these Questions; and the present Situation of Affairs is surrounded with so many Difficulties on every

every Side, that I believe the wisest Man in *England*, as I said before, would be at a Loss to judge what is most expedient in *such a Crisis*. But one Thing seems to be very obvious; that *those Persons*, who have intangled us in the *present Difficulties*, are the most unlikely to work us out of them again; for how can *They* speak to *foreign Courts* with that Dignity and Authority, which are necessary upon such an Occasion, when *They* have already dealt with every one of *Them*, and disoblig'd *Them* all in their Turns? It is not therefore surprizing to hear *such Men* crying out for Help, or to see *Them* ready to catch at any Hint, in order to justify their future Measures by the Sentiments and Characters of *Those*, whom *They* affect to despise.

When the Ship is really in Danger, all Hands must be at Work; and every Man will naturally endeavour, for his own Sake, to prevent her sinking; but, in the present Case, it is necessary to know our *whole Danger*, before any Gentleman will venture to give his Opinion upon it. There may be many more *secret Engagements*, or *Transactions*, than have yet come to our Knowledge; and how can any Body pretend to determine what Measures are most proper to be taken, till the *State of Affairs* is fully explain'd?

The *ministerial Writers* will cavil, perhaps, at this Conduct of the *Country Party*, and represent it as the Effect of a Resolution not to give the Government any Assistance, in Time of Danger, unless the Management of Affairs is put into their own Hands; but surely nothing can be more ridiculous than such an Imputation, in our *present Circumstances*. Men must be quite drunk, and even mad with the Lust of Power, to covet it on *such Terms*; and therefore if any of *Them* should be induced to undertake the publick Service, it ought

to be imputed to their Zeal for his *Majesty's Honour*, and a generous Design of rescuing their *Country* out of its *present Difficulties*.—But I have done ; and should not have made even these short Remarks, had I not accidentally met with a * *Pamphlet* just published ; in which the *Author* discovers all the Marks of *Timidity*, under the Disguise of *blustering Language*, and exhibits to us the ridiculous Image of *natural Insolence* struggling with *Consciousness of Guilt*.

What I proposed was to state our Case, as I found it, with Regard to *foreign Affairs* ; and to point out the several Gradations, by which We have been drawn into it. How We are to be extricated out of it, is beyond my Province, and must be referr'd to the Wisdom of *Parliament*.

I designed, indeed, to have added a State of our *domestick Affairs*, which have kept an equal Pace with *Those abroad*, as I am ready to prove by *Accounts* now lying before me ; but these Sheets being already swell'd to a much larger Compass than I proposed at first, the *second Part* must be reserv'd for another Opportunity.

However, there is *one Point*, which requires immediate Consideration, under our *present, unhappy Circumstances*, and therefore must not be intirely pass'd over in Silence. I mean the NAVY DEBT ; which is now calculated at near TWO MILLIONS, and hath been chiefly contracted since the Year 1722.

This Debt arises by the modern Practice of asking less on the *Navy Head* than the Service requires, in Order to keep up a larger Body of *Land Forces*, and at the same Time persuade unwary People that the *current Expences of the Year* are kept within due Bounds ; whereas, in Truth, We are every
Year

Year running in Debt upon *that Head*; for the Service of the *Navy* being justly more popular than That of the *Army*, it is natural for *Ministers*, who have private Reasons for not raising the *whole Supplies* within the Year, to cloak all *Deficiencies* under the most *favourite Head*. But this Practice is of very mischievous Consequence to the Publick, and hath often been complain'd of as such in *Parliament*, as well as from the *Throne*; though hitherto without Redress.

At the latter End of Queen *Anne's* Reign, the Parliament represented to her Majesty, " that increasing the *annual Expences* beyond the Supplies granted is an *illegal Practice*; a dangerous Invasion of the *Rights of Parliament*; and an Attempt, which differs very little from *levying Money without Consent of Parliament*."—— I chuse to quote these Passages from the *Representation*, at that Time, because They seem to have had so much Weight with a *certain honourable Gentleman*, that I find them transcribed into his own Observations on the *Navy Debt*, in the Year 1711.

At the opening of the Parliament in Oct. 1721, (soon after *this Gentleman* came into Power) the late King observed to Them, " that They could not but be sensible of the ill Consequences; which arise from such a large Debt unprovided for; that as long as the *Navy* and *victualling Bills* are at a very *high Discount*, they do not only affect all other *publick Credit*, but increase the Charge and Expence of the *currrent Service*.—— He farther observes, " that *this Debt*, of all others, is the most heavy and burthensome.

The present great Debt of the *Navy* is therefore a Subject, which seems to require immediate Consideration; and it is hoped that an effectual Stop will be put to such Practices for the future.

Neither

Neither would it be altogether improper to make some Enquiries into the present State of our *Shipping*, the Condition of our *Stores*, and the Reasons of that deplorable Desertion of our *Seamen*, which, if not speedily prevented, will render even our *Fleet* itself of but little Use.

All These are Points, which certainly deserve the Attention of a *British Parliament*; especially at a Time, when *Europe* is threatened with a general War, and our *Navy* at least ought to be put under the best Regulations.

Before I conclude, let me just mention *another Practice*, of the most dangerous Consequence to a *free State*; and That is the Method of granting Money without Limitation, Appropriation, or even so much as specifying the Services to be perform'd. This is commonly, and indeed not improperly, called a *Vote of Credit*; since it reposes an absolute Confidence in the *King* and his *Ministers* to act at Discretion, and make what Demands They please upon the People. I say, therefore, that it is a most dangerous Power, and may be made use of to destroy the very being of *Parliaments*, by depositing the *Purse of the Nation* in the Hands of the *Crown*, without any *Restriction*, or *Account*; for though *Ministers* are always ready to promise *Accounts*, when They are pleading for such *unlimited Grants*, yet they are constantly deny'd, when call'd for, as the *Journals of Parliament* abundantly testify; and This is one good Reason for suspecting the Use of them.

On the other Hand, all the Arguments advanced in Favour of *these Grants*, such as *sudden Exigences*, *unforeseen Accidents*, and *secret Service*, are meer Fallacies, to say no worse of them, and may be urged with the same Force at all Times, and by every *Minister*, without any Discrimination.

As

As to the personal Character of the *Prince*, it hath nothing to do in this Case, nor ought it to be introduc'd upon such an Occasion; for every Body knows that Concessions to a *good King* are always made Precedents for the same Complaisance to a *bad one*; and, indeed, who will presume to make the Distinction? Besides, the Character of the *best Prince*, that ever wore a Crown, ought not to be put in Competition with the *Privilege of Parliament*, and the *Liberties of a whole People*.

But if *Votes of Credit* are dangerous at all Times, They are peculiarly so just before a GENERAL ELECTION, when They may be employed to corrupt the *People* with their own Money, and destroy the Freedom of *that House*, from whence They receive their Force.

Whoever reads the Memoirs of *Philip de Commines*, will see that the Subjects of *Charles Duke of Burgundy* lost their Liberties by a *Power of the same Nature*, which that Prince artfully gain'd, under Pretence of keeping Himself always prepared against any sudden Surprizes from his Neighbour the King of *France*. And one great Blow was given to the Liberties of *France* itself, by the like *Concessions* to *Lewis the Eleventh*.

But the most remarkable Instance of the bad Consequences of such *extraordinary Grants* is recorded by Dr. *Geddes*; who tells us that * “ *Henry*
 “ *2d*, King of *Castile*, being resolv'd on a War
 “ with the *Moorish* King of *Granada*, in the Year
 “ 1406, demanded a large Supply of the *Cortes*
 “ for carrying it on; but the *Cortes*, judging the
 “ Sum too great for the People to pay, absolutely
 “ refused to grant more than *one Third* of what the
 “ King demanded; and when no Importunities could
 “ prevail upon Them to alter their Resolution, the
 “ King

* *Geddes's Tracts*, vol. i. p. 331.

“ King gave his Assent to the Bill, which They had
 “ pass’d for that Purpose; but at the same Time
 “ desired that in Case the Sum, which They had
 “ given, should be found not to be sufficient, They
 “ would impower Him, without assembling the Cortes,
 “ which would require Time, to raise Money upon
 “ the Subject, to supply that Deficiency.

Dr. Geddes observes “ that although the giv-
 “ ing the King such a Power was fiercely opposed
 “ by a great many Procurators as a Thing, that
 “ struck at the very Root of the Authority of a
 “ Cortes, it was carry’d by a Majority; and tho’
 “ it was granted only for a Year, yet That was
 “ enough to create such a Precedent, as would
 “ encourage their future Kings to desire to have
 “ the same Power, and to take it very ill, if it
 “ were deny’d Them; and by such weak, or
 “ CORRUPT CONCESSIONS as These it was, that
 “ the Spanish Cortes’s came to lose all their Au-
 “ thority.

F I N I S.

